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ABSTRACT
Context and Object Recognition
May, 1985
John Michael Henderson, B. S.
, University of Massachusetts
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alexander Pollatsek
on
This thesis examines the effects of context
object identification. In the past, researchers have
argued that the effects of a scene context on object
recognition can be explained by postulating that a scene
allows activation of a high level memory structure or
schema for the scene, which then facilitates the
identification of objects which are consistent with that
schema. The present work attempts to determine whether an
alternative explanation for these context effects is
viable. The alternative, called here " intra level
priming
" , suggests that automatic priming of unidentified
objects from already identified, semantical ly related
objects may be able to account for the context effects in
scenes. Experiment 1 demonstrates that an object fixated
on Fixation N can facilitate the identification of a
related ob j ect fixated on Fixation N + 1 . Experiment 2
provides evidence that this effect is due to an automatic
rather than a capacity demanding process. In addition,
iv
both experiments show how this intralevei priming
mechanism is affected by perceptual factors: The priming
effect tends to be larger when the target object can not
be easily seen in the parafovea. The results of these
experiments are taken to provide evidence that intralevei
priming provides a viable alternative to schema theory as
an explanation for the context effects found in the
visual processing of scenes.
V
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
on
This thesis examines the effects of context
object identification in pictures. In general, context
has been shown to facilitate recognition of a w lde
variety of perceptual stimuli. For example, letters are
more easily identified in words than in nonwords
(Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970); words are more easily
identified with single word contexts (Meyer,
Schveneveldt, & Ruddy, 1975), single object contexts
(Sperber, McCauley, Ragain, & Weil 1979), and sentence
contexts (Stanovich & West, 1983); and parafoveal words
are more easily identified with constraining semantic
contextual information than without ( Balota, Pollatsek, &
Rayner, 1985; Balota & Rayner, 1983; McClelland &
O'Regan, 1981). Using pictures of objects as stimuli, it
has been shown that identification is facilitated when an
object is presented in a coherent scene ( Biederman,
1972) but is inhibited if the object violates its
ordinary relation to the visual context (Biederman,
1981); object naming is facilitated by both single
object and single word contexts (Kroll & Potter, 1984;
Sperber et al.
,
1979); object misident ificat ion is more
likely if the target object visually resembles another
object which would be more likely in a given context
2(Palmer, 1975); and studies recording eye movements have
generally concluded that an object in a semantically
appropriate context is more easily identified than an
object which does not fit the context as well (Antes,
1974; Friedman, 1979; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978).
How Does Context Aid Object Identification in Scenes?
There are currently two main hypotheses regarding
the nature of contextual effects on object identification
in scenes. The first approach is to assume that higher
level memory representations known as frames (Minsky,
1975), schemas ( Bartlett, 1932; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975;
Rumelhart, 1980), or scripts ( Schank & Abelson, 1975)
interact with incoming perceptual information during
object identification. On this view, context is
facilitative because it acts to invoke the appropriate
memory structure (henceforth, schema). Objects which
are obligatory in the schema are encoded more or less
automatically (with a minimal use of processing
resources), while objects which do not fit the schema as
well require a more resource expensive encoding process,
and objects which do not fit the schema at all require
active hypothesis testing which is extremely resource
expensive (Friedman, 1979; Friedman & Liebelt, 1981). A
second approach, which is at this point a fledgling
3hypothesis but which will be investigated in the current
paper, suggests that context effects are produced
primarily through intralevel priming. On this view, the
information available to the object identification stage
is perceptual information from lower levels of processing
and information about other objects that have already
been identified (intralevel information), but not higher
level information. This approach may be referred to as
the intralevel priming approach and is consistent with
the concept of modularity ( Fodor, 1983; Marr, 1982).
Can a Schema be Accessed Quicly Enough
to Aid Object Identification?
In order for a memory structure such as a schema to
effectively aid object identificat ion, the memory
structure must be activated and functional prior to ( or
at least simultaneously with ) object identification
processing.
Several studies have indicated that the "gist" or
general meaning of a scene can be extracted very quickly,
in the range of 100 milliseconds (Potter, 1975, 1976;
Intraub, 1981 ) . For example, in a seminal study by Potter
( 1975 ) , sub j ects viewed a steady sequence of sixteen
pictures at a rate of 125 milliseconds per picture. The
task was to detect a particular target picture in the
4sequence. The target picture was identified for the
subject prior to exposure of the sequence either by
showing the subject the picture itself, or by giving the
subject a brief verbal description of the picture (e.g.,
"two men drinking beer"). Even at this high rate of
exposure, more than 70 percent of the target pictures
were detected, regardless of the manner in which the
target was originally identified to the subject, though
far fewer were remembered in a later recognition
test. Potter argued that on the average about 70 percent
of the pictures in the sequence must have been
identified, since a picture would have to be conceptually
identified in order to have been compared with a verbal
description. Potter (1976) again found similar results in
a replication experiment, when 64 percent of the named
targets were detected at a presentation rate of 113
milliseconds per picture.
While Potter does not discuss her findings in terms
of schema theory (and perhaps would be comfortable with a
more bottom-up interpretation), these results have often
been cited as evidence for the view that a general schema
for a scene can be accessed in approximately 100
milliseconds, well within the duration of the first
fixation in normal picture viewing. The argument put
forth by schema theorists (see Biederman, 1981) is
that the identification of a scene's general conceptual
5
meaning is equivalent to the activation of a schema for
that scene. Further, according to schema theory, schema
activation takes place before many (if any) objects have
been identified and acts to guide further encoding of the
scene. Since Potter finds rapid encoding of pictures to a
semantic level, schema theorists take this as evidence
that schemas can be quickly accessed. However, it should
be noted that even if subjects are able to quickly
encode a picture to a semantic level, this in no way
implies that the top-down processes envisioned by schema
theorists necessarily aid in the encoding process. (In
fact, it is not quite clear what encoding is left to be
done once a semantic level representation has been
achieved. ) In addition, the stimuli used in these
experiments were pictures of either a single object or
very few objects, and the task was such that
identification of a single foveal object would likely be
sufficient for a correct response. Therefore, these
experiments may have more to say about rapid object
identification than about rapid scene identification.
It could also be argued that the above results do
not in fact provide evidence for fast semantic
activation, especially fast activation without
foreknowledge, since Potter always precued subjects with
the target picture or a description of the target
picture. With precuing, expectancy or set may have
6selectively facilitated target identification, for
example, by priming object level representations, while
having had no effect at all upon non-target
processing. This in fact seems quite likely, since the
stimuli used in these experiments were designed in a way
that would allow subjects to identify the target picture
in a sequence through identification of one salient
object, with no need to process any other objects
contained in the picture (see Potter, 1976, p. 511). If
it were the case that expectancy allowed priming of the
"cognitive demon" or object level representation for a
particular object in the target picture, then the
conclusion that a high percentage of non-target pictures
had been identified would be unfounded. In fact, the
conclusion that even the target pictures had been
processed to a semantic level might be mistaken. Since
the main issue for the purposes of this paper is whether
the meaning of a scene (i.e. a schema) can be activated
quickly enough to aid object identification, it becomes
of concern whether Potter's results can be accounted for
by expectancy. If they can, then the results say little
about unprimed schema activation.
One finding seems to directly contradict the
expectancy hypothesis. In Experiment 2 of Potter (1976),
an explicit prediction of the expectancy hypothesis was
tested: Less processing should be needed to reject a
7non-target when the target is identified to subjects by
the picture itself than when it is identified by a verbal
description. In the former case, non-targets could be
rejected (and targets accepted) on a purely physical
basis, with no need to process them to a semantic
level, while in the latter case, a deeper level of
processing would be needed. In the original experiments,
Potter's cues were the pictures themselves. If her
results had been due to perceptual expectancy, then in a
recognition memory test, subjects' memory for non-targets
should be better after having been precued with the
description than after having been shown the picture
itself (e.g., Tulving & Gold, 1963). Since recognition
memory was found not to differ significantly in the
two conditions, the expectancy hypothesis was not
supported. These results were taken by Potter to indicate
that the non-target pictures in the sequence were
processed to a semantic level even when the target could
have been picked out on purely physical basis.
However, an alternative explanation is
possible. Suppose subjects were identifying the target
picture not by analyzing each picture to a semantic
level, but by looking for one salient object which should
only occur in the target picture. If this were true, then
giving either the target picture itself or a verbal
description should have the similar effects, namely to
aprime a "cognitive demon" for that object. In this case,
as Potter (1976) found, target detection would be better
given a picture of the target, since a more accurate
object level representation could be primed. In addition,
it might be expected that encoding of and recognition
memory for non-targets in the two conditions would be
equal, except that instead of describing the situation
as one in which recognition memory in the picture cue
condition was "as good as" that in the description cue
condition, as one would put it if arguing against the
expectancy explanation, it might better be said that
recognition memory in the description cue condition was
"as poor as" that in the picture cue condition. This is
because in both cases, the non-targets are processed at a
superficial level, while the targets are recognized by
virtue of expectancy, or priming for a particular
object. Evidence that this might be a better way of
looking at these data is that the recognition rate for
non-targets in both conditions was less than 10'/. correct
at a presentation rate of 113 msec per picture and only
20'/. correct across all presentation rates: 113, 167, 250,
and 333 msec.
One other reason that has been given for rejecting
the expectancy hypothesis is equivocal. Using the Potter
paradigm, Intraub (1981) found that 35 percent of the
targets were correctly identified when subjects were
9
given a negatively phrased description of the target
(e.g., "the picture that is not of house furnishings and
decorations"). Intraub argued that set or expectancy
could not account for these results, since it would
be difficult to set up an expectancy for a target based
on knowing only what that target is not. Accordingly, in
order for 35 percent of the targets to have been
identified, approximately 35 percent of all of the
pictures, including non-targets, must have been
identified. However, Intraub's data are not
unproblematic. First, there is a large difference between
the detection rate for targets in positively (71 percent)
and negatively (35 percent) phrased groups. Thus, it
could be that set is playing some role in the positive
group. Second, it could be argued that in the negatively
phrased condition, subjects created an expectancey for
the non-targets, along with a response rule to choose the
stimulus that didn't meet that expectancy. Since all of
the non-targets would meet such an expectancy (and
would probably share some set of common features), such a
strategy, though undoubtedly less efficient than
responding positively to an expectation, would
work. Finally, Intraub only used pictures of single
objects, while Potter used pictures of both single
objects and several objects. As was pointed out above,
different processes may well be involved in the
10
identification of objects versus scenes, and for the
purposes of the current discussion, it is the speedy
identification of scenes that is of importance.
Finally, data provided by Potter (1976) can be taken
as evidence in favor of an expectancy explanation for the
speed at which her subjects could identify the target
pictures. As noted above, it has previously been shown
that one consequence of expectancy is to decrease the
identification accuracy of those items which are not
expected (Tulving & Gold, 1963). If expectancy is not the
reason for the high rates of detection in the Potter
paradigm, then recognition for non-targets should be
equally good whether the sequence of pictures is viewed
with or without a target search task. On the other hand,
the expectancy hypothesis predicts that recognition
memory for non-targets will be worse when the sequence is
viewed with the target search task than without.
Consonant with the expectancy hypothesis, recognition
memory for non-targets was significantly lower when the
subject was watching for a particular target than when
not
.
In summary, the data often cited as evidence
supporting the view that the gist of a scene can be
identified quickly is not as conclusive as it is
sometimes portrayed. Admittedly, many of the alternative
explanations given above are shamefully post hoc. Still,
11
while it does appear that a target picture can be
detected quite rapidly (on the order of 100 msec), it is
questionable whether this high rate of detection could
occur without prior expectation. It is also questionable
whether the non-target pictures (those for which there is
no expectancy) are being processed to a semantic level at
these short exposure durations. Finally, these
experiments for the most part involve one or very few
objects, not scenes, and therefore say nothing about how
quickly complex scenes can be processed to a conceptual
level. Therefore, it seems premature to conclude that the
meaning of a scene for which there is no prior
expectation can be accessed at a speed which would be
useful for subsequent object identification.
Evidence for Schema Theory
The results most often cited (e.g. by Antes,
1977; Carr L Bacharach, 1976; Friedman, 1979; Loftus &
Mackworth, 1978) as supportive of the claim that schema
activation facilitates object identification are those of
Biederman and his colleagues. In the paradigm experiment,
Biederman (1972) presented photographed scenes and had
subjects identify which object from a response set
of four objects occupied a given cued position in the
scene. The main variable of interest was whether the
12
scene was coherent or jumbled. Jumbled scenes were formed
by dividing the coherent scenes into six equal sections
and rearranging five of these (the sixth section, which
contained the target object, was not moved). Other
manipulations included stimulus duration, presentation
order of the position cue and the scene, and presentation
order of the response set and the scene. The results were
that the scene coherency and the presentation order
manipulations affected object identification.
Identification was more accurate (a) with coherent
scenes, (b) with the location cue presented prior to the
scene, and (c) with the response set presented prior to
the scene. Stimulus duration was not a significant
factor, and there were no interactions. Based on these
results, Biederman concluded, "It is most likely that
jumbling affected an early, but not peripheral, stage
involved in the perceptual recognition of the cued
object," and wondered, "Is the functional unit an
individual object, or does an observer have access to
more global units or schema?" (Biederman, 1972, page 79).
Based on further research employing the jumbling
manipulation (Biederman, Glass, & Stacy, 1973), Biederman
opted for the primacy of schemas: "an initial holistic
categorization of the stimulus (determined by gross
feature tests and context) biases the subsequent testing,
weighting, and combination of detailed features. . .
"
13
(Biederman et al.
, 1973, page 26).
According to Biederman (1981) a schema for a scene
can be activated by "global features" of the scene. These
global features are what the jumblxng manipulation is
assumed to disrupt. The flow of information in this type
of model is depicted in Figure 1.
The concept of global features as posited by
Biederman cannot be restated as suggesting simply that
spatial relationships affect object identification.
Instead, global features are thought to be higher order
visual features which allow access to schema
representations in memory before objects and spatial
relationships have been (fully) identified. The jumbling
manipulation is thought to disrupt the global features
in the scene, making schema activation slow or
impossible. This analysis of course assumes the reality
of such entities as global features. However, while
Biederman ( 1981 ) has attempted to produce examples of
global features, they have yet to be adequately
specified. Further, it is difficult to see how such
features could be specified, given the possible visual
diversity of even the simplest of scenes. For example,
the global features of a scene are taken to arise from
the ob j ects in the scene. Therefore, the global features
incorporate information about both general shape and
spatial position of the objects which comprise the
Figure 1
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scene. In order for these features to be useful, they
would have to be fairly invariant (as is also true
of any feature based theory of object recogmt ion ) . Given
the problem of finding invariant features in objects, the
problem of invariant global features for scenes would
seem even more difficult. For a scene such as a living
room, the number, shape, and spatial arrangement of the
objects are each extremely
. variable, and any of these
factors would change the global features of the scene. It
seems incumbant upon schema theorists to show how global
features could be specified under these types of
variations.
In the following discussion, an attempt will be made
to show that the conclusions drawn from the experiments
by Biederman and his colleagues may be unjustified.
Several general problems with the basic methodology will
be discussed.
Consider first the manner in which Biederman 's
jumbling manipulation is performed. A photograph is cut
into six equal pieces, and all but one of these pieces
are then moved to a new location. The most striking thing
about these jumbled scenes is the disruption of
meaningful contours and the addition of new, meaningless
contours. If contours play the central role in vision
that many theorists believe (e.g. Hochberg, 1978; Julesz,
1971; Marr, 1982) then this manipulation may be
16
equivalent to a severe degradation of the stilus
through the introduction of meaningless visual noise.
Under such circumstances, procesess operative in object
identification would be expected to suffer even under
conditions in which the subject knew where to look and
what to look for (as found in Biederman, Rabinowitz,
Glass, & Stacy, 1974). Supportive of this claim is the
fact that the jumbling manipulation interacted with
stimulus duration in an object identification task
(Biederman et al.
, 1974). While a schema theorist might
like to conclude that an object in a coherent scene is
identified faster due to the aid of a schema in the
non-jumbled condition, an alternative explanation is that
object identification takes longer given a degraded
stimulus. (This issue could be resolved by testing object
identification in coherent versus jumbled scenes in which
the test object does not belong. The schema theory
predicts that a coherent scene which does not activate a
useful schema (i. e. a scene in which the object does not
belong) will not facilitate object identification
over the same jumbled scene, while the stimulus
degradation position predicts that the jumbling
manipulation will be about equally disruptive regardless
of whether the object fits in the scene or not.
)
A second problem with the jumbling manipulation is
that the addition of meaningless contours and the
17
disruption of meaningful contours may be especially
troublesome in the visual periphery where incoming
information xs not optimal even under the best vxewxng
conditions. In experiments where subjects must scan a
scene in search of a particular object (e.g. Biederman
et al., 1973), eye movements play a significant role.
Under such circumstances extrafoveal information is used
to help determine where to send the eye next (Antes,
1974; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967). In addition, useful
visual information gathered from the periphery can be
integrated with foveal information when that area is
fixated in order to facilitate identification (Pollatsek,
Rayner, & Collins, 1984). The disruption of contours may
adversely affect any of these processes.
The jumbling manipulation may further interact with
other variables which affect the number of object
identifications or eye fixations needed to carry out the
task, as in Biederman et al. (1973), where the design of
the experiment allowed a quick exit from an object search
if the object was unlikely in the scene but required an
exhaustive search if the object was likely. The results
are easily explained by the extra processing time
required in the jumbled condition for each additional
object identification or eye fixation necessary. In fact,
Biederman et al. (1973) were aware that the schema
explanation was not necessary in order to account for
18
their data, smce the presentation time was long enough
to allow several eye fixations. However, even under
conditions where eye-movements are not possible, such as
in Biederman et ai. (1974), a schema explanation is not
necessary in order to explain interactions between the
jumbling manipulation and other variables which affect
the time needed to process the scene, since extra
processing time is likely to be required in order to
identify extrafoveal objects in the jumbled scenes.
Again, an interaction between jumbling and a variable
which affects the amount of time spent on extrafoveal
processing (e.g. the label similarity manipulation in
Biederman et al.
, 1974), can be explained (and would be
expected) given that each additional "unit" of
extrafoveal object sampling would require more time in
the jumbled scene condition when compared with the normal
scene condition. Given this analysis it does not seem
necessary to postulate that the jumbling manipulation
affects a schema activation process. Instead, the
disruption of natural contours and concurrent stimulus
degradation seem sufficient to account for the reported
results.
In addition, a third problem with the jumbling
manipulation is that it destroys the spatial structure of
the scene. While on the face of it this may sound similar
to stating that jumbling destroys "global features,
"
19
there is an important distinction to be made. In the
schema model, global features serve to suggest a schema,
which then acts in a top-down manner to facility, object
identification (see Figure 1). An alternative to this
account is to suggest that object td.ntification and
spatial structure identification are two separate
processes which operate in parallel and without
communication (i.e. they are infoptionally encapsulated
with respect to one another; see Fodor, 1983; Marr,
1982; Ullman, 1985). If jumbling were to make the
constuction of a spatial representation of the scene more
difficult (without necessarily affecting object
identification), then tasks which require identification
of the spatial relationships between objects (what was
where?) would be more susceptible to performance
inhibition from this manipulation. In the experiments
conducted by Biederman and his colleagues requiring
identification of an object at a cued position
(Biederman, 1972; Biederman et al., 1974), the manner in
which the subjects made their responses was to point to
one of four possible choice objects. It is important to
note that the three distractor objects were all in the
scene. Therefore, this task requires not only object
identification, but also a representation of object
location. Thus, in these experiments it is not at all
clear whether it is the object identification or spatial
20
structure process ( cr both) that is bemg affected by the
jumbling manipulation.
In a later series of experiments, Biederman has
attempted to show that "semantic" relations between
objects are accessed at least as quickly as "physical"
relations. In these experiments (summarized in Biederman,
1981), semantic relations (e.g. the probability of an
object occurring, being in a particular position, and
being a particular size) and physical relations
(e.g. support for an object which should rest on
something, and interposition or occlusion of an object
when it occurs behind another) were manipulated in a
scene. For example, in a living room scene, a floating
couch would violate the physical relation of support,
while an upside-down couch would violate the semantic
relation of position. The effects of manipulating these
relations were examined in object detection and violation
detection tasks. Based on the findings that both types of
relation violations equally affected performance in these
tasks, and further that semantic relation violations
added to the disruption in task performance caused by
physical relation violations, Biederman concluded that
"semantic relations are accessed at least as rapidly as
relations reflecting the pervasive physical constraints
of interposition and support that are not dependent
on meaning..." (Biederman, 1981, page 253). Since
21
semantic violations affected object ident ifxcat xon at
least as much as physxcal vxolatxons dxd, the xmplxcatxon
is that semantic relations are computed simultaneously
with a physical parsxng of the scene and before object
identification.
There are many problems with these experiments, but
two warrant special mention. First, much hinges on the
distinction between support as a physical relation versus
position as a semantic relation, yet this distinction
seems neither empirically nor theoretically
justifiable. On the one hand, if the human visual system
processes support as a physical relation (at the level of
the physical parser, e.g. Winston, 1970), then the same
disruption that a floating couch causes shold also be
found with birds, balloons, airplanes, ceiling lights,
and pictures hanging on a wall, none of which have
visually obvious means of support. Biederman has provided
no evidence for the position that support violations
invariably cause disruptions in scene processing, and it
is doubtful that those who believe in an early physical
parsing level for human vision, such as Winston, would
make this claim. On the other hand, if support is
determined by a later stage of analysis which bases its
decision in part upon the identity of an object (i.e. the
semantics of the object ) , then the distinction between
support as physical ly specified and position ( or
22
probability or size) as semantically specified seems
meaningless. Just as the detection of a position
violation depends in part on the semantics of the scene,
so too does the detection of support violations.
Therefore, the finding that support violations affect the
same stages of processing as violations of position or
size or probability shows not that semantic
representations of a scene are available as quickly as a
physical parse of the scene, but instead shows only that
one type of semantic relation is available at about the
same time as others.
In addition to support, Biederman also included
interposition as a physical relation. Interposition
occurs when a solid object occludes the contours of an
object behind it. Again, in these experiments it was
found that the semantic violations were equally as
disruptive on object identification as was an
interposition violation (an interposi t ion violation was
defined as the ability to see the contours of another
ob j ect through what should have been an opaque ob j ect,
for example, being able to see a man's leg through his
briefcase ) . Also, it was found that semantic violations
were more easily and more quickly detected than was an
interposition violation, and that semantic violations
added to the disruption caused by an interposition
violation. And again, based on these results, the
23
conclusion was that semantic relations must be accessed
at least as quickly as physical relations.
One could, of course, wonder whether interposition
13 an/ leSS Semantlc than support-- after all, glass is a
fairly common substance. Still, even if it is taken as
fact that interposition is determined at a strictly
physical level, questions remain. First, it is worth
noting that in general, across all of the experiments
discussed in Biederman (1981), interposition violations
have little if any effect at all. If one examines the
examples of the line drawings used in these experiments,
one possible reason for this becomes
apparent: Interposition violations are very difficult to
see in line drawings.
However, even ignoring the above criticisms, a
possibly fatal methodological problem presents itself: In
these experiments, a brief view of the scene is followed
by a pattern mask, and the effects of semantic versus
physical violations are then examined. Yet, as Marcel
(1983) has shown, pattern masks differentially affect
various representational levels. In particular, pattern
masks seem to affect the availability of physical
representations of visual input while leaving semantic
representations relatively unaffected. Given this
possibility, the use of a pattern mask in experiments
attempting to contrast the effects of physical and
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semantic representations seems ill advised, and one i.
left wondering what would have happened in these
experiments if a pattern mask had not been employed.
A final problem with both the violation and jumbling
paradigms is the nature of the tasks used to explore
object identification. Object identification is one stage
in a series of processing stages required for the
construction and retention in memory of the
representation of a scene. In order to isolate the
object identification stage from later stages in the
processing sequence, it is necessary to choose a measure
of object identification carefully. Most preferably, one
would use an on-line measure of performance, where an
on-line measure can be defined as one which taps a
representation as it is being constructed. With regard to
object identification, such a measure should be
unaffected by processes and representations which occur
after the object identification stage. None of the
experiments reviewed in this section employed an on-line
measure, and it is not clear that post - percept ual
information integration and response bias effects have
been adequately controlled. In the next section, the
results from experiments using a different measure, eye
movement patterns recorded during scene processing,
are examined.
Eye Movements and Picture Viewing
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ne particularly useful method for studying the
effects of a scene context on object identification, and
for studying scene processing in general, i. to record
the eye movements of the viewer. This technique allows
the experimenter to know exactly where and for how long
an observer is viewing a particular section of the
scene.
During picture viewing, eye movements can be
characterized as consisting of two components, fixations
and saccades. Fixations are short periods of time
averaging between 250-350 msec (Rayner, 1978; Yarbus,
1967) during picture viewing when the eye is relatively
stationary and visual information is taken in. Saccades
are quick jumps of the eye which occur between fixations
and which bring new information into the fovea. Neither
fixations nor saccades are homogeneous during picture
viewing; fixation durations, fixation densities, and
saccadic extent are all quite variable, even for one
observer viewing one picture for a short amount of
time. In reading, fixation duration and saccadic extent
seem to reflect different underlying cognitive processes
(e.g., Rayner & McConkie, 1976 ) , and this may also be
true in picture percept ion, though it has yet to be shown
empirically.
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Based on the results from studies recording eye
movements during reading (see Rayner, 1978), It seems
that eye movement patterns during picture perception
provide an excellent "online" measure of the time course
of underlying cognitive processes. It has further been
assumed that the variability in fixation durations and
saccadic extents provides a good indication of processing
difficulty. For example, First Fixation Duration, the
duration of the first fixation on an object or section of
a scene, has been taken as a reflection of the time
needed to encode that object or section (Friedman, 1979;
Loftus, 1972). (In contrast. Gaze Duration is the total
fixation time across saccades spent fixating an object or
section of the scene, and is taken to reflect both
encoding and post
-encoding processes. ) While it may be
that factors other than encoding difficulty affect first
fixation duration, it seems a reasonable assumption that
first fixation duration reflects at least encoding
time. Since the primary interest in this paper is object
identification or encoding, the preferred variable will
be first fixation duration.
Context Effects on First Fixation Duration
Under the assumption that first fixation duration is
a good reflection of encoding time, the hypothesis that
schemas mediate contextual effects on object
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identification predicts that the first fixation duration
on an object which 1. an explicit argument in an
activated schema will be shorter than the first fixation
duratxon on an object which is optional to the activated
schema, which in turn should be shorter than the first
fixation duration on an object which does not fit the
schema at all.
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) conducted a study in
which they constructed 78 groups of four pictures, the
four pictures consisting of a pair of normal scenes and a
pair constructed by switching one object from each of the
scenes into the other (thus a cow in a farm scene would
be switched with an octopus in an underwater scene) to
create scenes with one "informative" or low probability
object in each. Subjects were then shown one of the
four scenes from each group for four seconds each and
told to examine the picture "as if" for a later
recogntion test. Consistent with the above prediction,
low probability objects were fixated longer at the same
location in the same background as high probability
objects, both on the first fixation to the object and on
the subsequent few fixations. Since the distance of
the fixation just prior to the fixation on the object of
interest was about the same for both conditions (an
average of 6.5 to 8 degrees of visual angle), the
difference in first fixation duration was not accounted
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for by a closer parafoveal preview in one condition than
another. It was therefore concluded that encoding time
for objects which fit a schema are faster than for
objects which do not.
There are, however, several possible problems
here. First, even though the average distance of the last
fixation before the fixation on the target object was the
same regardless of condition, it is • still possible that
more visual information was processed parafoveally when
the object fit the context (see Balota, Pollatsek, 8.
Rayner, 1985, for evidence of this in reading). That
is, low probability objects may be fixated longer
on the first fixation because they are less thoroughly
processed in the parafovea. Of course, this leads one to
ask why more information can be extracted from a probable
object in the parafovea, and the schema theory may
equally well take this type of data as supportive. A
second problem is that while Loftus and Mackworth show
that objects which do not fit in a scene at all are
fixated longer than objects which are highly likely to be
in the scene, they do not examine the second part of the
prediction, which says that the first fixation duration
on an object which is an explicit argument in an
activated schema will be shorter than the first fixation
duration on an object which is an optional argument in
that schema. Perhaps longer first fixations on objects
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wh.ch don't fit in a scene at all < e
. g. ( oct upus In a
farm scene) reflect not longer encoding tin,,, but a
"double- take " or recheckinn + ,iiecnecK g of the input to make sure
that the original encoding was correct.
In a study conducted by Friedman (1979), one group
of subjects rated the likelihood that each object from a
list of objects would be found in a particular
scene. Complex line drawings were then constructed which
contained high, medium, and low probability
objects. Unlike Loftus and Mackworth (1978), all of the
objects were at least reasonable in these scenes (e.g., a
fireplace in a kitchen would be a low probability
object). A second group of subjects then viewed each of
six pictures for 30 seconds. The pictures were precued by
the general topic (e.g., "kitchen") and the subjects were
told that they "would later have to be able to
distinguish between the original pictures and new
pictures in which, for example, only a small detail on
one object would be different. " Again, consistent with
the schema hypothesis, first fixation durations to high
probability objects were significantly shorter than first
fixation durations to either medium or low probability
objects. Further, in support of the notion that first
fixation duration reflects perceptual factors such as
encoding better than later fixations, rated likelihood
accounted for far more of the variation in fixation
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duration on the first fixation (between 27.7'/. and 52.4V.
depending on the scene) compared to the second (14.4'/. to
38.6',) or later (5.6'/. to 24.1%) fixations, and though
there was an association between rated likelihood and
total fixatxon duratxon or "gaze™ (324 msec, 379 msec,
and 562 msec to high, medium, and low probabxUty objects
respectively, according to Friedman and Liebelt, 1981),
this association virtually disappeared when the variance
attributable to first fixations was partialled out.
In criticism of this study, it could be argued that
30 seconds is an unusually long time to view continuously
a line drawing of a scene, and that because subjects knew
they would have this amount of time for each picture,
they may have adopted an unusual viewing
strategy. Second, Friedman precued subjects on the topic
of each scene, so the ability to access a schema quickly
and use it in object identification wasn't tested. On the
other hand, it may be that precuing has little effect on
schema activation ( Biederman, Teitelbaum, & Mezzanotte,
1983), and even if it does, it could be argued that
precuing is more ecologically valid since one normally
has some idea of the general nature of the next visual
event. Third, since there was no significant difference
between first fixation duration to medium and low
probability objects, the prediction of the schema theory
was not fully supported. Still, null results are not very
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convincing either way, and two of the three compariSQns
were in the predicted direction. In general, these
results seem to support Loftus and Mackworth (1978) in
the conclusion that objects which are more likely to
appear in a particular scene (and so be arguments in a
particular schema) are fixated for less time on the first
fixation than objects that are less likely to appear.
There is a further problem common to both of the
above studies. According to the schema theory, the
encoding of objects which are arguments in a particular
schema should be facilitated when that schema has been
accessed. Therefore, the prediction of the schema theory
is not only that the first fixation duration to a highly
likely object will be shorter than that to a less likely
object, but also that first fixation duration to an
object appearing in a scene in which it is highly
probable will be shorter than when it appears in a
neutral-context baseline. On the other hand, it is not
clear whether encoding of an object which does not fit
with the schema should be inhibited relative to a neutral
baseline; the prediction would depend upon the process by
which schemas affect encoding. If target objects which
do not fit in a scene require active hypothesis testing
mechanisms, as proposed by Friedman (1979), then an
inappropriate schema activated by an inappropriate scene
would be expected to cause inhibition in identifying that
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object in comparison to a n«=,, + ^ieutral context, since the
inappropriate schema would snrroiBO+u xa uggest inappropriate
hypotheses to be tested. If, lnstead
, schemas
object encoding through automatic processes, then no
inhibition would be expected. While both Loftus and
Mackworth (1978, and Friedman (1979) have shown that
expected objects are fixated for less time relative to
low probability objects, it could be argued that this
difference is due to factors slowing down processing of
low probability objects rather than speeding processing
of high probability objects. Since the schema theory
specifically predicts the latter, this distinction is
important.
A recent study by Antes and Penland (1981) attempted
to provide a neutral baseline condition in order to
determine whether providing the context of a scene was in
fact facilitating encoding of expected objects as
predicted by the schema theory, was inhibiting encoding
of unexpected objects, or both. They constructed 23
complex line drawings of scenes, within each of which
four objects were designated as targets. One pair of
targets in each picture was within 5 degrees of the
center of the picture while the other pair was beyond 5
degrees, and each pair contained one expected and one
unexpected object as determined by subjective probability
ratings. Aside from these 23 scenes which were designated
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the hxgh context condition, 23 low context pictures were
created by copying the four target objects plus two
other non-overlapping objects fro. the scene, preserving
spatial positxons, but with no other objects or
background. Ten pictures from each context condition were
shown in a random order for four seconds each, and
subjects were told "to view the picture in preparation
for an object recognition test after each picture."
This test involved choosing the object which had appeared
in the picture from an array of four objects.
Consistent with the prediction of the schema theory,
there was a significant interaction between context and
expectedness, such that mean first fixation duration on
expected objects was shorter in the high context
condition than in the low context condition, while there
was no difference for unexpected objects across the two
conditions. Taking the low context condition as a
baseline, it therefore appears as though encoding of an
object which is expected in a given scene is facilitated
relative to a base rate of encoding while an object which
is not expected is neither facilitated nor
inhibited. Before accepting these results as definitive,
however, several aspects of the study should be
noted. First, as in the Loftus and Mackworth (1978)
study, many of the unexpected objects were not only
unexpected, but simply did not fit in the high context
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scenes at all. Second, as Antes and Penland point out,
contrary to what might have been predlcted given ^
schema theory, the mean firat fixation duratxon on
expected objects was not signxf xcant ly shorter fro. that
on unexpected objects in the hxgh context
condxtxon. Still, thxs null f lnding snouid not fae toQ
worrxsome sxnce the data were xn the rxght dxrectxon, and
sxnce it appeared as though the expected objects were
generally more difficult to encode than the unexpected
objects, as indicated by the finding that first fxxatxon
durations to the expected objects were longer xn the low
context condition also.
A thxrd and more fundamental problem with the Antes
and Penland study is that there were more objects in the
hxgh context than low context conditxon. Because of thxs,
a direct comparxson across the two conditxons becomes
difficult. For example, since there were more objects in
the hxgh context condition, the first fxxation on a
target object in the high context condition would
presumably be later on the average than in the low
context condition. This means that there would have been
more parafoveal processing of the target objects in the
high context condition The fact that there was a
sxgnificant main effect of context such that t'xrst
fixatxon duration for both expected and unexpected
objects was shorter in the high context condxtion than in
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the low context condition lends support to thl.
possibility. If highly constrained perceptuai Btimuli
benefit more from parafoveal processing than do less
constraxned (as suggested by the results obtained xn
reading by Balota, Pollatsek, and Rayner, 1985), then
differences xn fxrst fxxatxon duratxon to target objects
may reflect dxfferent levels of parafoveal prxmxng rather
than dxrectly reflectxng the effect of context on
absolute encodxng time. As poxnted out above, a schema
theory advocate could argue that thxs explanation sxmply
moves the problem back a step and leads one to ask how
context allows extraction of more information from a
highly constrained object in the parafovea than from a
less constrained object. And schema theory may posit
a similar explanation for this type of effect as tor
differential first fixation duration, without
compromising the position that a schema facilitates
encoding. However, another consequence of the difference
in the number of objects in the two conditions is that
the estimate of encoding time in the baseline condition
may have been inflated. This could occur for two
reasons: (1) subjects may have adopted a strategy of
spending more time on each object in the baseline
condition because they knew that they would have the
same total amount of viewing time but fewer objects to
look at, and (2) fewer objects in the parafovea may
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"draw" the eye less powerfully away from the foveal
stimulus. In either case, encoding time without context
would be overestimated. If the basellne were
overestimated, then the pattern of facilitation for
high probability objects but not for low probability
objects would be an artifact. Until the two conditions
are more tightly controlled, it seems ill-advised to
conclude one way or the other whether context is
facilitate* for high probability objects, inhibxtive for
low probability objects, or both.
Overall, the above three studies taken together
indicate only that first fixation durations to high
probability objects are on the average shorter than those
to low probability objects. While this result is
consistent with schema theory, it is probably also
consistent with a multitude of other theories as well. In
fact, any memory structure/ process combination which
could generate expectations about which objects should be
encountered next (given a certain scene or set of objects
as context) would be equally predictive and explanatory
of the data. Since the few obvious predictions
distinguishing schema theory have yet to be adequately
tested, it is not at all clear that one need specifically
posit schemata as the type of memory structure
responsible for the context effect, even if one feels
that a top-down influence from some activated memory
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structure t. th. cause of these effects. <It should be
obvious that data which see. to .ndxcate that ,eBry for
scenes involves schema use, e. g . . Antes> 1977; Friedman>
1979; Mandler and Johnson 1 qvc -i„°
'
iy76
'
do not bear on the issue
of object identification in scenes, since memory for and
perception of scenes may entail the use of totally
different structures and processes. )
Further, there may be good reason not to use the
theoretical construct of a schema at all, since it i.
extremely broad and undiagnost ic. Frxedman (1979)
gxves the most precxse account of the manner in which
schemata are thought to affect perceptual processing, and
even here there are few predictions which can be made
without argument. For example, Antes and Penland (1981)
suggest that expected objects demand more attention in
the parafovea (i.e., should be fixated sooner), while
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) suggest that unexpected
objects do. Both pairs of researchers base these
predictions on the schema theory. Also, the exact
mechanism by which a schema produces contextual
facilitation has yet to be specified. So far, only the
distinction between top-down and bottom-up processing has
been suggested to account for object identification in
and out of context. Without a more explicit model of how
top-down knowledge can affect object identification,
the schema theory will remain extremely difficult to
falsxf y
.
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General Criticisma and an Alternative Explanation
Aside from the specie problems for schema theory
raised in the above sections, there are also some general
considerations that should be taken into account in
formmg a theory of context effects and visual object
identification. Perhaps chief among these is the degree
to which the theory allows context to influence object
identification. For many years, the common wisdom held in
computer vision was that all knowledge sources would have
to be consulted in a highly interactive way in order
to identify an object. This type of view was accepted
into cognitive psychology (e.g. Neisser, 1967) and is one
of the traditions from which schema theory in visual
cognition derives. However, models of this type have
severe problems, one of which is that systems which rely
heavily on top-down processing tend to see what they
expect to see rather than what is actually in the
environment. And as Fodor aptly says, "a condition for
the reliablility of perception, at least for a fallible
organism, is that it generally sees what's there, not
what it wants or expects to be there. Organisms that
don't do so become deceased" (Fodor, 1983).
Since schema theories in psychology are generally
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not specified in great detail
-i + -i „a
<-
a i, t is often difficult to
tell the exact manner in which the top-down influence
fro* the schema is supposed to affect the identification
process, and therefore to what degree the top-down
information actually influences the content of the
resultant perceptual descriptions. Cetainly many
psychologists who believe in schema theories of vision
also believe that misapplication of a schema will lead to
misidentification of objects (e.g. Treisman & Gelade,
1980). However, one of the most remarkable aspects of
human vision is the rapidity with which objects can be
recognized, even in the absence of expectation
(e.g. Biederman, 1985). In fact, when misidentification
does occur, it is usually quite striking, for example,
when a cardboard box on the road is taken as an animal
under the degrading visual conditions of a dark
night. The fact that misidentification is striking when
it occurs suggests that it doesn't occur very often. The
question that needs to be asked is whether it is
reasonable to posit that the human visual system is as
easily fooled as schema theories seem to imply.
A second question which schema theory has yet to
address is how the knowledge contained in a schema
actually influences the recognition process. Some
possibilities are that a schema alters the order in which
memory representations are matched against the input.
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causes a search tor particular features or parts of
objects in particular places, lowers the goodness of lit
threshold lor expected objects, generates and fits
particular expected templates, or fill. tn expected parts
of objects (Pinker, 1984). Friedman (1979) has been most
explicit in her description of how a schema facilitate
object recognition (see discussion above), but it is not
at all clear that other researchers accept her
view. Certainly the predicted effects of schema
activation are going to be different depending on the
manner in which the knowledge contained in a schema is
used. It is an issue whether schema theory can be taken
as a theory at all until it is specified to a level that
allows testable predictions and consequences to be
formulated.
A third type of problem for any theory of perception
(including schema theory) which allows general semantic
knowledge to influence perceptual processes, is what has
come to be known as the "frame problem" in artificial
intelligence (Minsky, 1975). In brief, the problem is one
of determining which aspects of all available world
knowledge are relevant to a particualr situation. For
example, Biederman, Mezzanotte, and Rabinowitz (1982)
specify that position is a semantic relation of objects
to their visual contexts that is contained in the schema
used in object identification. However, how much position
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knowledge is contained i„ the scnema? Presurnabiy> ^
schema for a living room would dictate that chairs should
be on the floor. Would this then predict that a chair
Placed on a couch (say, so that the floor could be
washed) would be difficult to identify? Or is the
knowledge that chairs are moved when floors are washed
also contamed in the schema? If someone picked up a
chair to move it. would this make it harder to
recognize? Must the schema contain the fact that people
can lift chairs? The issue, then, for schema theory is to
provide an account of how and where a boundary is
drawn around the relevant information given a particular
context. So far, theorists working in computer vision
have found this problem extremely difficult, and
consequently much of their work has returned to a more
stimulus driven approach (Marr, 1982).
A final issue relates to the type of theorizing that
one would want in the study of vision. If the choice is
made to deal with all difficult problems in vision by
postulating top-down processing, then processes which in
fact are computed in a more bottom-up fashion may be
totally missed. Further, an emphasis on top-down
processing will cause an under -estimation of the
information that is contained in the light array reaching
the eye (e.g. Gibson, 1966; Marr, 1982). Another way of
saying this is that we are more likely to discover
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structure by postulate it. Mlstmce than by assuming
that it doesn't exist (as argued by see researchers
working in language procession « c^ * Hiuu ng, e.g. Forster, 1S79;
Frazier, Clifton, & Randall. 19A3)oj-x, ^oJ^. lif after a careful
search, it turns out that certain problems are impossible
to solve wxthout postulating top-down influences, then at
that time models should xnclude them. But if models start
out assuming top-down processing, then the
representations whxch are computed xn a bottom-up fashion
and the processes that compute them may never be found.
If the assumption that top-down influences are
ubiquitous in object recognition is rejected, then how
are the demonstrated effects of context on object
recognition to be explained? One possibility is that all
of the effects are actually due to post
-percept ual
factors, such as response biases induced by the tasks
used to study recognition, and semantic integration of
the recognized objects into a higher level representation
of the entire scene. The former explanation can probably
be ruled out, at least for those studies which employed
eye movement monitoring, since in those experiments there
were no overt responses required. However, the latter
explanation is more difficult to rule out; if an object
doesn't fit into its scene, then presumably it is going
to be more difficult to integrate that object into a
semantic representation of the scene as a whole. To the
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extent that the techniques used to ~* m<-i ufcfts study recognition
employ measures susceptible to post
-percept uai processing
such as integration, lt i. going to be diffioult to
tell whether recognition itself can be influenced by
context. There is no guarantee that either the detection
paradigm used by Biederman or the fixation duration
measure are influenced by recognition factors alone.
An alternative explanation for the effects oi
context on object identification derives from the
literature on object priming. This work has its
foundations in the claRRiru,c? ss c lexical priming eitlect
demonstrated by Meyer, Sch vaneveldt
, and Ruddy (1975) in
which it was found that recognition of a word such as
"nurse" was facilitated when that word was preceded by a
related word such as "doctor" rather than when preceded
by another, unrelated word. The explanation for this
effect is taken to be automatic, passive spreading
activation between nodes in lexical or conceptual memory
( Collins and Loft us, 1975 )
.
Using a paradigm similar to that used in examining
lexical priming, similar effects have been found with
pictures of objects as stimuli (e.g. Carr, McCauley,
Sperber, & Par me lee, 1982 ; Kroll & Potter, 1984,
McCauley, Parmelee, Sperber, & Carr, 1980). Again, the
explanation for this effect is generally agreed to be
passive spreading activation between nodes in semantic
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mem°ry
-
Th-'"»1«». « alternative explanation for
context efxects seems to be available. This explanat
»xll be denoted as "intralevel priming".
ion
Intralevel Priming
According to this view, context can aiiect object
identification by virtue of a mechanism in which already
identified objects prime representations for related and
as yet unidentified objects. This priming could take
place intralexically (through representations of the
object names) or «t the level of object
representations. In either case, a higher level
representation of the entire scene is not invoked. The
mechanism for this priming can be thought of as similar
to that proposed in the word recognition literature, such
as spreading activation (Collins & Loftus,
1975). Further, these processes are hypothesized to be
automatic ( Posner & Snyder, 1975), as opposed to
requiring attentional resources. In its extreme form,
this type of explanation is equivalent to the proposal
that object identification is performed by a processing
module which is " inf or ma t ionally encapsulated" ( Fodor,
1983). That is, the object identification processor is
deaf to representations which are formed on the basis of
the module's output. Therefore, higher level processors
which integrate the output provided by the module cannot
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prov.de input to that
.oduie nor affect the
.odule's
subsequent processing of new input. Saxd another way. a
modular systen, would not alio. the integrated
representation of a scene to a ffBr+x.o iiect the processing of an
as yet unidentified object in that scene.
The types of information which a module can use are
representations which must be computed prior to the
operation of that module and which serve as its input,
for example featural information in the case of object
identification, and information which is necessarily
contained within the module, for example the object
representations themselves and the structure which
organizes them and makes them retrievable.
According to the intralevel priming view of object
identification, context effects occur as a result of the
organization of the representations within the
module. Simple associative or semantic links among the
object representations allow priming among objects
without top-down processing. While this seems to make the
object recognition module relatively "dumb", the tradeoff
is that the module gains the benefit of speed: All
sources of information need not be considered in
computing an output. Evidence for the quick access of
meaning from individual objects has been provided by the
Potter experiments discussed above, as well as by
Biederman (1985). Whether foveal objects would similarly
4b
prime subsequently fixated objects t- ^
addressed by these Experiments.
If it can be shown that a single object fixated on
fixation n can prime the xdentincation of a related
object on fixation ^ then the beginning at an
explanation for the effects of context on object
identification in scene processing can be proposed which
does not involve the use of schemas. The explanation
would be that in conditions where an object fits a
scene context, the likelihood will be high that a
semantically related object will have been fixated
immediately before the target object was
fixated. Spreading activation from the node of the object
identified on fixation n would then raise the activation
level of all related object nodes. When, on fixation
DjJ^ a related object was fixated, recognition of that
object would be facilitated due to the higher level of
activation of its representation node. On the other hand,
if an object is placed in a scene in which it does not
fit, the probability will be relatively high that an
unrelated object will have been fixated immediately
before. Therefore, the node representing that object
will be at a resting level o± activation and will require
more extensive processing in order to be recognized. This
simple mechanism will therefore account for the longer
fixations needed to recognize objects which do not fit
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the scene context.
( In experiments whxch do not allow eye
m°VementS
'
SUCh 98 et al., 1974, the assumptxon
would be that in a proper acene context, the ioveal
object WM be .ore likely to be related to and to prxme
the parafoveal xdent if xcation of the target object. ) This
explanation makes the assumptxon that objects whxch
go together in scenes tend to be more semantically
related to each other than objects whxch do not iorm a
scene. A moment's reflection wxll show that thxs
assumption xs not unreasonable.
The two experxments presented in thxs thesxs are an
attempt to explore the effects of context on the
recognition of objects using a paradxgm whxch has been
shown in the word prxming and object primxng literature
to be sensxtxve to perceptual and relatively xnsensxtive
to post-perceptual factors (Sexdenberg, Waters, Sanders,
& Langer, 1984). Thxs paradxgm uses namxng latency as an
indication of recognition time. In addxtion, these
experiments attempt to provide a direct test o± the
intralevel prxmxng model of context effects by usxng only
a sxngle ioveal object as context.
CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that
is
identxficatxon of a pictured object presented foveaiiy
facilitated when that object is preceded by a related
object also presented foveaiiy, compared with when an
unrelated object precedes the target object (e.g. Carr,
McCauley, Sperber, & Parmelee, 1982; Kroll & Potter,
1984; McCauley, Parmelee, Sperber, & Carr, 1980). The
results of these experiments mirror the effects found
when both associated and semantically related words are
used as stimuli (e.g. Meyer, Schveneveldt
, & Ruddy, 1975;
Fischler, 1977; Henderson & Hansen, in progress), and are
generally interpreted as an automatic process ( Posner &
Snyder, 1975) within a spreading-activat ion framework
(Collins & Loftus, 1975).
In addition, a second set of experiments, conducted
by Pollatsek, Rayner, & Collins (1984) has shown that
information gathered from an extrafoveal object during
one fixation can facilitate the recognition of that
object when it is foveaiiy fixated (replicated by
Pollatsek, Rayner, & Henderson, in progress). The
Pollatsek et al. studies demonstrate that information
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from an extrafoveal obiect can k=J C be integrated across
saccades. These results »
i
also mirror those found in
studies with words (Balnf- t ocb ota & Rayner, 1983; McConkie &
Zola, 1979; Rayner, McConkie & Zola, 1980.
)
The above studies are important because they
indicate that the visual context in which an object
occurs influences the identification of that object, and
yet the explanation for these effects does not invoke
schema-type processes. However, a problem with both of
the above paradigms is that they are only approximations
to the sequence of events which occurs during normal
scene viewing. The foveal priming studies can be thought
of as simulating eye movements, but unlike normal picture
viewing, no eye movement is made and no extrafoveal
preview information is available. The integration
experiments are closer to normal viewing since eye
movements are made to extrafoveal objects; however, in
these studies, there is no meaningful object in the fovea
before the eye moves.
The current experiment was an attempt to combine the
above paradigms in order to determine whether an object
fixated in the fovea would facilitate identification of a
related extrafoveal object after a saccade brought the
extrafoveal object into the fovea. This type of an effect
would be expected if the intralevel priming explanation
of facilitation found for object recognition in scenes is
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correct. In order to exami „e thi. questlon
, two .timUil
were presented on the CRT Simultaneously, one foveally
and the other extrafoveally. On one third of the trials,
the critical object pairs were related. one third
contained unrelated obiects =.r,^Dj , and one thxrd involved a
non-meaningful foveal "blob". The task was to execute an
eye movement to the extrafoveal object and name it as
quickly as possible. If priming is possibie frQm fQveal
to extrafoveal objects, then naming tin.es should be
faster when the objects are related compared wxth when
they are unrelated. (The schema theory makes no explicit
predictions about what should happen- here, although as
currently formulated, there is no mechanism to account
for such priming if it should occur. )
A concurrent purpose was to determine whether more
information can be gathered from the extrafoveal object
when there is a related object in the fovea. Such an
effect of foveal context on parafoveal information
extraction has been found with word targets, using both
single word ( Inhoff , 1982, Balota & Rayner, 1983) and
sentence contexts (Balota, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1985;
McClelland & Q'Regan, 1981). In order to examine the
effect of having a parafoveal preview of the eventual
target on identification once that target had been
fixated, half of the trials allowed a parafoveal preview
of the target, while on the other half of the trials no
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parafoveal preview was given.
Finally, two other var--. =>k 1ariables common to scene
perception were manipulated: First, subjects participated
in two blocks, one in which eye movements were from left
to right, and the other in which eye movements were from
right to left. Second, two visual eccentricities were
used between the foveal and parafoveal stimuli: 5 degrees
and 10 degrees. Several studies have shown differential
effects of context on object identification depending on
the distance of the to-be- identified object from the
current fixation (Antes, 1974; Friedman, 1979; Parker,
1978). Also, the amount of parafoveal information
extracted has been shown to depend on visual distance
(Nelson & Loftus, 1980; Pollatsek et al.
, 1984).
The intralevel priming explanation of context
effects in scene perception predicts that naming times in
the related foveal prime condition will be faster than
those in the unrelated foveal prime condition. A finding
of this type would indicate that encoding a foveal object
on fixation N can affect the encoding of another foveal
object on fixation N+l. This could be interpreted
as indicating: (1) Schema explanations are not necessary
to explain context effects in scene viewing, since the
same type of effect can be obtained with single object
contexts (this would be an extremely strong conclusion to
draw from these data-- however, the burden of proof might
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then fall on schema theorists to show how a schema
explanation adds to this explanation of context effects);
or (2) A schema can be activated on the basis of a single
object (this would require major modification of the
schema model )
.
The Pollatsek et al. studies (1984; in progress)
cited above have shown that a parafoveal preview of an
object facilitates subsequent encoding of that object
when it is fixated. Such an effect would also be expected
in the present experiment. Of greater interest is how the
effects of Fovea 1 Prime and Parafoveal Preview may
combine. An overadditive interaction between these
factors (i.e. more priming when there is a preview)
would imply that more information can be obtained from a
parafoveal object when that object occurs in the context
provided by a single related foveal object. If a single
foveal object were able to both facilitate information
extraction from a parafoveal object and facilitate
encoding of that object once it was fixated, the need for
postulating schema activation in order to account for
context effects in scene viewing would be greatly
reduced. On the other hand, if Foveal Prime and
Parafoveal Preview were to show additivity with respect
to naming time, additive factors logic would suggest that
these factors affect different stages of processing
(Sternberg, 1969).
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Method
Subjects. Eight members of th. Universlty Qf
Massachusetts subject poo! participated i„ th.
experiment.
Materials. The stimuli were 60 li„e drawings of
common objects which had been combined into 30 pairs of
related objects, all easily identified and named (a
complete list is given in Table 1; the line drawings were
mostly taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart, I960, with a
few exceptions). The same drawings were also randomly
combined into 30 pairs of unrelated objects to serve in
the unrelated foveal prime condition.
In addition, two control stimuli were employed:
(DA square, slightly larger than the objects, empty
except for a small fixation cross in the center, was used
as a parafoveal stimulus in the No Parafoveal Preview
condition in order to give subjects a target to move
their eyes to; and (2) A meaningless, roughly rectangular
"blob" made up of irregularly drawn sides and filled with
three irregularly drawn interior line segments, equated
for the number of pixels contained by the average object
drawing, was used as a non-meaningful foveal prime.
Subjects were asked to name each of the objects
before the experiment. If necessary, the experimenter
corrected the name employed, and the objects were
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repeatedly presented until the expercenter was sure that
the subject had the appropriate name for each object.
Apparatus. The stimuli were displayed on a
Hewlett-Packard 1300A CRT with a P-31 phosphor. The CRT
has the charactpriotin + K18UC tnat removing a point results in a
drop to 1% of maximum brightness in 0.25 msec. A black
theater gel covered the CRT so that the display appeared
clear and sharp to the subjects.
Eye movements were monitored via a Stanford Research
Institute Dual Purkmje eyetracker. The eyetracker and
CRT were interfaced with a Hewlett-Packard 2100 computer
which controled the experiment. The drawings were entered
into the computer via a Summagraphics Bit-Pad. During the
experiment, the computer kept a complete record of
saccade latencies, accuracy, and naming latencies. The
signal from the eyetracker was sampled every 1 msec by
the computer and the position of the eye was determined
every 4 msec. When the subject made an eye movement in
the appropriate direction, the computer immediately
replaced the parafoveal preview item with the parafoveal
target object. The computer initiated the change when
an eye movement of 0. 5 degrees in the appropriate
direction was detected and the change was completed
within 5 msec. Since a saccade of 5 degrees (to the
nearest target object) requires approximately 35 msec,
the display change was always completed during the
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saccade .hen vision was suppressed. Previous studies
using this technxque indicate that subjects do not see
the change taking place.
The subject's eyes were 46 cm iron, the CRT and each
object subtended approximately 2 degrees of visual angle
horizontally and from 1 to 3 degrees vertically over the
set of objects. Eye movements were monitored from the
right eye, although viewing was binocular.
Procedure. Upon arriving for an experimental
session, each subject was seated comfortably with his or
her head resting on a chin and forehead rest to minimize
any head movements. The room was dark except for the
displays on the screen and a dim indirect light source.
The calibration of the eye movement system then took
place. After calibration, 32 practice trials were given
followed by two blocks of 360 test trials. A trial
consisted of the following events: First, a fixation
display appeared (initiated by the experimenter), made up
of five fixation crosses-- one at the left-hand boundary
of the screen, one at the center, one at the right-hand
boundary of the screen, and one each approximately one
degree toward the center of the screen from the boundary
crosses. The subject was instructed to look at one of the
fixation crosses (the inner-left cross in the
left -to-right eye movement condition and the inner-right
cross in the r lgh t - to- lef t eye movement condition), and
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the experimenter checked to see whether the calibration
was accurate. (A sixth cross m0ved with the computed eye
position, indicating that the apparatus was calibrated if
this sixth cross coincided with the appropriate fixation
cross.) If the calibration was satisfactory, the
experimenter warned the subject that the trial was to
begin, and approximately 250 msec later the fixation
crosses were replaced by a foveal stimulus (object or
blob) and a parafoveal stimulus (object or box). The
subject then moved his or her eyes to the parafoveal
item. During the saccade, the parafoveal item was
replaced by the parafoveal target object (as described
above), and the subject named this target object as
quickly as possible. The computer recorded the latency of
the vocal response (timed from when the eye crossed the
0.5 degree threshold point). The experimenter recorded
the accuracy of the response and/or whether there had
been a loss of tracking accuracy on that trial.
ghe Eye Movement Direction factor was blocked, with
the order of blocks counterbalanced across subjects. The
experiment was completed in two sessions, one session for
each block, generaly run on consecutive days, with each
session lasting 45 to 60 minutes.
Design
The experiment consisted of 720 trials per
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subject. The 720 tri.1. consisted of the factorial
combination of 30 (parafoveal targets) X 3 (related
versus unrelated versus non-meaningful foveal prime) X 2
(parafoveal preview versus no parafoveal preview) X 2 (5
degree versus 10 degree visual eccentricity, X '2 (left
versus rxght eye movement direction). All factors were
manxpulated within subject. Eye Movement Direction
was blocked, with order of blocks counterbalanced across
subjects. Each foveal prime occured with a related and
unrelated parafoveal target an equal number of times in
order to preclude conscious prediction strategies.
Table 1
Target obiects and their related foveal primes
Foveal Prime
hand
dog
coat
bee
horse
knife
doctor
hammer
truck
fridge
Target
foot
cat
hat
flower
cow
gun
nurse
saw
car
stove
Table 1 (continued)
5a
lock
leal
shirt
sock
table
fork
leg
rabbit
bat
cheese
lightbulb
apple
glass
horn
ash tray
comb
wagon
star
bell
anchor
key
tree
tie
shoe
chair
spoon
arm
squirrel
ball
mouse
lamp
pear
cup
drum
pipe
brush
sled
moon
whistle
boat
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Results and Discussion
The corrected mean naming latencies, collapsed over
items, subjects, and direction of eye-movement, are
presented in Table 2. Naming errors were very infrequent
(they occurred on less than .01 Qf the trials) and were
randomly distributed across conditions. The analyses
reported in this section were conducted on corrected mean
response times. These corrected times excluded all noise
trials. Noise trials consisted of either (1) trials on
which voice key failures, track losses, and naming errors
occurred; (2) trials on which the saccade latency was
either less than 150 msec or greater than 400 msec; and
(3) trials on which naming latency was greater than 3
standard deviations from that subject's mean latency for
that particular block. The mean percentages of noise
trials so defined for each condition are also shown in
Table 2. The pattern of results for the corrected mean
naming latencies did not differ from the pattern before
correction.
A 3 (Foveal Prime) X 2 (Parafoveal Preview) X 2
(Eccentricity) X 2 (Eye Movement Direction)
within-subject ANOVA was conducted on the mean naming
latencies, treating subjects as a random effect.
Eye Movement Direction produced neither a main
effect (F < 1) nor interacted with any other factor, and
hence will be ignored in the remainder of this
discussion
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Table 2
Mean time to name thP t B roet nM^ , n msgc (anH me_
percentage of noise trial c) h y Eccent,^,^
,
p^^.-,,
Preview
, and Foveal Pnmo.
No Preview
. Preview
Eccentricity rei unrel blob rel unrel blob
5 degrees 720 731 723 631 629 605
( . 07 ) ( . 06) ( . 07) ( . 05) ( . 07 ) ( . 07)
10 degrees 706 733 724 667 683 669
( . 09) ( . 11 ) ( . 09) ( . 13 ) ( . 11 ) ( . 10)
The first question of interest is whether the two
main variables. Parafoveal Preview and Foveal Prime, had
an effect on naming latencies. Consistent with Pollatsek
et al. ( 1984 ) , there was a significant main effect of
Parafoveal Preview CF<1,7) = 357.4513, £ < .00005]. The
mean naming latency was 647 msec with a preview and 723
msec without. In addition, the amount of benefit derived
from a parafoveal preview was mediated by the distance of
61
the parafoveal stimulus, so that » s h~» h ma a 5 degree parafoveal
preview was more useful than = 1 r>UA a 10 degree preview,
Fd,7)
= 36.4570, a < . 00 1, for the interaction of
Parafoveal Preview by Eccentricity. At 5 degrees, mean
naming latency was 725 msec without a preview and 622
msec with a preview, indicating a preview benefit ol 103
msec. At 10 degrees, naming latenc.es were 721 msec
without a preview and 673 msec with a preview, giving a
benefit of 48 msec. The main effect of Eccentricity was
also significant by itself CF<1,7) = 34.5474, p_ < .001],
although this effect was clearly mediated by the
interaction with Parafoveal Preview.
The effect of Foveal Prime was also significant
CF<2, 14) = 3.8981, p_ < .053. Mean naming latencies for
the related, unrelated, and blob conditions were 681,
694, and 680 msec, respectively. Even though subjects
were never explicitly told to attend to the foveal
primes, and in fact were told to move their eyes as
quickly as possible to the parafoveal stimulus, the
foveal primes were encoded to a level where they could
exert an influence on subsequent processing. Target
naming latencies were facilitated when the foveal prime
was related to that target compared to when the foveal
prime was an unrelated object. This result suggests an
explanation for at least some of the effect of context
found in studies in which the likelihood of an object's
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OCCUrri"9 " " - ™anipuiated! th. prevlously
fixated object a«ects th. ld.ntlfio,tion Qf ^
currently fixated object.
Another important aspect of these data xs that the
unrelated condition shows inhibition in relation to the
blob condition, while the related and blob conditions are
Virtually td.ntlc.l. Accordxng to a Posner and Snyder
(1975) two-process account of prxmxng, a fxndxng of
xnhxbxtxon for unrelated prxmes in relatxon to a neutral
baselxne xndxcates the use of an attentxonal process,
rather than the use of an automatic process such as
spreading actxvatxon. In other words, the fact that
inhxbxtxon was apparently dominant may indicate that
subjects were using attentional strategies, such as an
active prediction strategy, and were incurring a cost
when their expectations were violated. While this is a
possibility that cannot be ruled out in this experiment,
there are several aspects of the data that are
inconsistent with this interpretation.
First, an attentional expectancy strategy would
predict not only a cost for trials on which the
prediction was incorrect, but also some facilitation for
those trials on which the prediction turned out to be
correct, such as on the related -prime trials in this
experiment. However, the related and blob conditions were
virtually identical, 681 versus 680 msec, making it seem
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unlikely that a predlctlon strategy ^
employed. Second, the mean saccade latency tn this
experiment was 250 msec, meaning that the stimulus onset
asynchrony < SOA
) between a foveal iixation of the
prime and the target was about 285 to 300 msec (250 msec
saccade latency plus approximately 35 to 50 msec saccade
duration). In previous experiments which used the pxcture
priming paradigm (e.g. Carr et al.
, 1982; McCauleyet
al., I960), SOAs of over 500 msec were found to produce
automatic facilitation. Therefore, 300 msec is probably
too little time for attentional processes to become
active (see also Neely, 1977). Finally, evidence to be
presented in Experiment 2 is inconsistent with this
interpretation.
There is an alternative to the hypothesis that the
use of an attentional strategy caused the inhibition
shown for the unrelated condition. The choice of an
appropriate neutral baseline has been an issue in the
word-priming literature (e.g. deGroot, 1983), and a
similar issue can be raised here. In particular, the blob
chosen in the current experiment as the neutral stimulus
may, in hindsight, have been a poor choice. First, the
blob, unlike the related and unrelated primes, did not
have a name or label associated with it, at least
not one that would be automatically activated, as would
have been the case with the objects. Therefore, while
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there was the possibliity fQr stroQp _ like ^
competition between the prime and target in the case of
the object pri.ee, no such possibility existed for the
blob prime. Naming latencies with the blob prime may have
been speeded due to the lac, of this type of name
competition. Further, aside from the problem of name
competition in the case of the object prx.es, McCauley et
al. (1980) have argued that the process of attaching a
name to a priming picture during an object priming
paradxgm is a capacity demanding operation that can
interfere with the naming of a subsequent
picture. Therefore, covertly naming the foveal prime,
holding the name in an STM buffer, and then preparing a
different name as a response may all tend to slow the
object prime conditions in relation to the blob prime
condition.
Second, while the neutral stimulus was equated with
the objects for the average number of pixels used to
create the stimuli, it may have been that the actual
visual complexity of the two types of primes was not
equated, such that the object primes were more visually
complex. The more complex object primes may have required
more visual processing capacity for analysis. Further,
meaningful visual stimuli may also capture more central
processing capacity, since a meaningful stimulus will
tend to make contact with long-term memory
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representations. Thi. would again leave lees capacity lor
processing the parafoveal stimulus in the case of the
related and unrelated primes, while nearly all capacity
could be used for DrocesHinn +k«p s g the parafoval preview and
the target stimulus m the case of the non-meaningful
blob prime. All or any of these differences between the
object primes and the neutral prime would tend to
have the effect of underestimating the response time in
the neutral condition. An underestimated neutral response
time, in turn, would have the effect of underestimating
facilitation and overestimating inhibition.
Table 3 presents the interaction o± Foveal Prime
with Parafoveal Preview [F<2,14> = 5.6000, p_< .05]. As
can be seen in Table 3, this interaction results from the
greater iacilitative effect of the parafoveal preview on
naming latency when there was a blob in the fovea
compared with when there was a related object in the
fovea. Removing the blob condition from the analysis
caused the interaction to disappear, F(l,7) = 4.0557, p_ >
. 05. It appears as though the subjects were better
able to make use of the parafoveal information when there
was a non-meaningful object in the fovea. This lends
credence to the view that the blob condition was not
really neutral, but instead engaged fewer processing
resources and therefore underes t i ma ted the true baseline.
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Table 3
^2*11 naming latencies for the three levels of Fqvp.i
Prime and two levels of Pa rafoveal Preview. Also shown is
the relative amount of benefit due to the preview.
Foveal Pri me
Parafoveal Preview rel unrel blob
No Preview 713 732 724
Preview 649 656 637
Benefit 64 76 86
Table 4 presents the interaction of Foveal Prime
with Eccentricity CF(2, 14) = 8.0359, g. < .005]. It is
clear from Table 4 that moving the target closer proved
more facilitative when there was a blob in the fovea than
when there was an object in the fovea. It is tempting to
conclude again that it is easier to make use of the
closer parafoveal information when there is a blob rather
than an object in the fovea. However, this time the
story is not quite as clear as it was in the case of the
Foveal Prime by Parafoveal Preview interaction,
since: (1) The difference in the "benefit" (10 degrees
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mlnUS 5 bet
— ^ "oh and unrelated condition
is mil and not significant by a Slmple e±fects anaiysis
< 1), and (2) The Eccentricity factor does not
dlSUn9U1Sh betWSen Prance or absence of a parafoveal
prevxew. If the explanation for the relatively greater
facilitation for a closer target with a blob in the fovea
xs that the blob does not interfere as much with
parafoveal processing (which is .ore important with a
closer parafoveal preview) as do the object primes (an
argument similar to the one made above for the Foveal
Prime by Parafoveal Preview interaction), then the
relatively greater facilitation found with the blob in
the fovea and the closer target should only have occurred
when there was, in fact, a parafoveal preview. While the
three-way interaction between Foveal Prime, Parafoveal
Preview, and Eccentricity did not approach significance
(F < 1), the data clearly show a trend in the direction
suggested, as can be seen in Table 5: Moving the target
closer was more beneficial with a blob rather than an
object in the fovea mainly when there was also a preview
in the parafovea. While it would be unwise to make too
much out of a nonsignificant interaction, the data in
Table 5 are suggestive of the possibility that the blob
condition was detracting less from the ability to process
a parafoveal stimulus than were the object prime
conditions, leading again to the conclusion that placing
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a non-nameable, non-meaningful blob, rather than a
nameable, meaningful object, in tne fovea ^
parafoveal information extraction easier.
Table 4
Mean naming latencies for thg levelH ^ P_
,
Foveal Prime
Eccentricity rei unrel biob
10 Degrees 686 70S 697
5 Degrees 675 680 664
Benefit 11 28 32
In sum, it is not possible from these data to
determine the exact nature of the difference between
having the objects versus the biob in the fovea. It seems
likely that the blob was processed differently in at
least two respects : First, the blob allowed more
information to be picked up from the parafovea when that
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information was avaxlable. Thxs is xnterestxng xn its
own right, sxnce it suggests that the amount of
parafoveal xnformatxon picked up on a fixation depends
upon the complexity of the object in the fovea. Second,
the blob disrupted the naming of the target less,
possxbly because there was no chance for exther name
competition or confusxon at the response stage. Given
these differences, any analysis using the blob as a
baselxne from which to assess priming would seem unwxse.
Table 5
Mean naming latencies (in msec) with an obiect versus a
blob in the fovea, for the two levels of Parafoveal
Preview and two levels of Eccentricity. Also shown is the
relative amount of benefit due to the closer
eccentricity
No Preview Preview
Eccentricity object blob object blob
10 Degrees
5 Degrees
719
725
724
723
675
630
669
605
Benefit -6 1 45 64
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Since the neutral foveal prime condition in this
study seems suspect, and since Experiment 2 attempts to
provide a more judiciously chosen neutral baseline,
"priming" i„ Experiment 1 will henceforth be examined in
terms of the differences in naming latency between the
related and unrelated foveal prime conditions rather than
in relation to the blob condition.
Analysis Without Baseline. A second ANOVA, identical
to the first but excluding the blob condition, was
conducted in order to examine the effects of the related
and unrelated foveal primes. Only those results related
to the foveal prime conditions will be reported, though
all other effects mirrored those reported above in the
overall analysis.
This analysis revealed that the object levels
(related versus unrelated) of the factor Foveal Prime
differed significantly from each other [F(l,7) = 6.3205,
p_ < .053. There was an overall priming effect of 13 msec
for related vs unrelated primes. These two levels of
Foveal Prime also interacted with Eccentricity CF(1,7) =
7.9176, g_ < . 05 J . At 10 degrees, there was a 22 msec
priming effect, while at 5 degrees the effect was only
5 msec. The two levels of Foveal Prime also interacted
marginally with Parafoveal Preview CF(1,7) = 4.2234, .05
< p_ < . 10], such that the priming effect was 19 msec with
71
no preview and 7 msec with a parafoveal preview. The
effects of Parafoveal Preview and Eccentricity were
additive with respect to the priming effect ( [ F < 1] for
the three way xnteractxon of Foveal Prime X Parafoveal
Prevxew X Eccentricity). These interactxons can be
seen xn Table 6 where the data are expressed xn terms the
prxmxng effect-- the differences in latency between the
related and unrelated foveal prime condxtions.
As can be seen xn Table 6, the related foveal prime
was most useful when there was no preview and the target
was furthest away, at 10 degrees. Less facilitation was
found when there was a preview or when the target was
closer, and finally no facilitation was found at all for
the related over the unrelated prime when the preview
appeared at 5 degrees in the parafovea.
Table 6
Amount of priming (unrelated minus related conditions) in
msec by Parafoveal Preview and Eccentricity.
Eccentricity No Preview Preview
5 degrees
10 degrees
11
27
-2
16
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These results show that the related foveal prxme was
usetul under certaxn cxrcumstances. In particular, tt
appears that the related prxme was most useful when the
target was difficult or xmpossxble to see xn the
parafovea, x. e. the 10 degree eccentrxcxty and no prevxew
conditions, and least useful when the target could be
processed easxly xn the parafovea, i.e. when there was a
prevxew at 5 degrees. In general, then, it appears
that priming occurs only when the target object cannot be
easxly processed xn the parafovea.
This general conclusion cannot be entxrely complete,
hovever: Another xnterestxng aspect of the data presented
xn Table 6 is that there was a difference xn the amount
of priming found at 5 and 10 degrees, even when there was
no parafoveal prevxew. Thxs dxfference xs somewhat
surprising; eccentricity here refers only to the dxstance
the eye had to travel xn order to fixate the eventual
target, and not to the distance of a parafoveal prevxew,
sxnce in thxs condition there was no parafoveal
preview. In other words, these conditions were virtually
identical aside from the distance that the eye had to
travel to fixate the target. Why, then should there be a
dxfference xn prxmxng of thxs magnxtude between these two
cells?
For the moment, thxs issue will be put off, and will
be taken up agaxn xn Chapter 3.
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In conclusion, several general statements about the
data from this experiment can be made. First, it 1. clear
that visual information about an object gathered from the
parafovea aids subsequent identification of the object
when that object is fixated. This replicates the work of
PollatseK et al. (1984) and extends it to a situation in
which there is a meaningful object in the fovea. It
appears that while more information can be extracted from
the parafovea when there is a non-meaningful stimulus in
the fovea, a great deal can also be extracted when
there is a meaningful object in the fovea, even out to 10
degrees visual angle (see Table 7).
Table 7
Parafoveal Preview effect (no preview minus preview) as a
function of Eccentricity and type of foveal stimulus.
Foveal Stimulus
Eccentricity Object Blob
5 Degrees 95 118
10 Degrees 44 55
Second, identification of a fixated object is
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affected by th*»X e °*Ject fixated immediately
before. Particularly, an object 1. ld.ntifi#d faster if
the object seen on the previous fiction was related
rather than unrelated to it. This aspect of the data thus
supports the intralevel priming model of context ejects
in scene perception.
Finally, recall that it was origanally hypothesxzed
that the foveal prx.es and parafoveal preview mxght show
an over-addxtxve relat xonshxp, such that there would be
more facxlitatxon from a paraloveal prevxew when there
was a related compared to an unrelated object in the
fovea. Such a result would have xndxcated that paraloveal
xnlormation was more useful given a related foveal
object. Instead, the marginal interaction between these
two factors is in the opposite direction. It appears
that, if anything, the parafoveal preview was less useful
given a related foveal prime; or, to turn it around, the
related foveal prime was less useful given a parafoveal
preview. If this interaction is reliable, it indicates
that priming of the sort shown here is useful only when
the to-be identified object is difficult to see, for
example when it is far away or when it is masked by other
ob j ects.
Experiment 2 seeks to replicate and extend these
results.
Experiment 2
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In Experiment 1 lt was shown that the id.ntific.t ion
of an object can be f.cilift.d If a related object
rather than an unrelated object is viewed on the previous
fixation. However, smce a meaningless blob was used as
the control prime, it was impossible to determine whether
the dxfference between the related and unrelated primes
was due to actual facxlxtatxon from the related object,
inhibition from the unrelated object, or some combxnatxon
of both. The dxstxnctxon between facxlxtatxon and
xnhxbxtxon is theoretically xmportant, sxnce the
automatic priming process posited here as an account of
the context effects found m scene processing
specilically predicts that facilitation without
inhibition should be found. On the other hand, if the
priming effect observed in Experiment 1 was due to an
expectancy strategy, where subjects allocated attention
to a particular response given a particular prime, then
inhibition would be predicted when the target was not the
expected object.
In order to determine whether the priming eflect
demonstrated in Experiment 1 was facilitation rather than
inhibition dominant, a different and more diagnostic
neutral prime was chosen for the current
experiment. Specifically, four objects which were not
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predictive of any of the thirty targets were chosen to
serve as neutral primes. These four neutral primes
appeared randomly whenever a neutral prime was called
for. Therefore, there was no way for sublets to use an
expectancy strategy when these objects appeared. If the
priming effect found in Experiment 1 was due to
facilitation without inhibition, then the related prime
condition in the current experiment should be faster than
both the unrelated and neutral prime conditions, while
the latter two should not differ from each other. If, on
the other hand, the priming effect ls due to
non-automatic processes involving allocation of
attention, then the unrelated prime condition should show
inhibition in relation to the neutral prime condition.
A second purpose of the current experiment was to
determine whether a priming effect could be made to occur
at 5 degrees even when the subject was allowed a
parafoveal preview of the target, if the parafoveal
preview were made more difficult to see. (Recall that in
Experiment 1, there was a tendency for the priming effect
to be smaller or even disappear if the target could be
seen clearly in the parafovea, that is, if there was a
close parafoveal preview. ) One of the differences between
normal scenes and the stimuli used in Experiment 1 is
that in scenes, parafoveal objects are surrounded by
other objects and background, making them more difficult
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to see. In order to simulate this in th" l l e paradigm
used here
.ithout adding the confound Qf ^
nameable objects in the parafovea. the sa,e blob as was
used in Experiment 1 was placed between the foveal prl,e
and the parafoveal preview on half of the tnals so
that the preview would be more difficult to see. It was
expected that this would increase the amount of pricing
shown at 5 degrees.
Finally, some of the results found in Experiment 1
were unexpected. For example, more priming was found at
10 degrees than at 5 degrees even when there was no
parafoveal preview of the target. It is not entirely
clear why this should be so. Further, there was a
tendency for there to be less distance and preview
benefit for related compared with unrelated foveal
primes. Experiment 2 served to determine whether these
results were replicable.
Method
Subjects. Eight members of the University of
Massachusetts subject pool participated in the
experiment. Six of the eight subjects had also
participated in Exper i men t 1
.
Materials. The stimuli used were the same 60 line
drawings as used in Experiment 1. In addition, the blob
used as a foveal prime in Experiment 1 was used here as a
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parafoveal "mask". Also, four new .u line drawings taken
fro. Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980) replaced the blob as
the neutral prime. These objects were a bed, a cannon, a
snowman, and a stoplight. It should be noted that each of
these neutral primes was m fact related to at least
one of the targets in some way. This could not be helped,
since with thirty targets, it is virtually impossible to
find 4 objects which are totally unrelated to any of the
targets. The important point to keep m mind, however, is
that, given one o± the 30 non-neutral primes, there was a
.50 probability that a particular related object would be
the target and a
.50 probability that a particular
unrelated object would be the target, while given one
of the neutral primes, the probability was only .033 that
the quasi-related object would be the target, and the
probability was also .033 that the target would be any
particular other target object. Therefore, with the
neutral primes, the probability was .966 that the target
would not be the quasi - related object, and so the target
was virtually unpredictable given a neutral prime.
As in Experiment 1, subjects were asked to name each
of the objects before the experiment, and were corrected
until they had the appropriate name for each object.
Apparatus. The equipment used was the same as used
in Experiment 1. Aside from all of the functions already
described above, the computer also randomized which of
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the four neutral obiects wo,, i hej uld occur on a particular
neutral trial.
as in
as
Procedure. The procedure „as the seme
Experiment t. with the following exceptions. First.
already described, the neutral . ii i loveal prxme condition
consisted of four objects rather than the meaningless
blob. On a neutral trial, the computer randomly selected
which one of the four neutral objects would be displayed.
Second, a new factor, Parafoveal Mask, was
introduced, which was fully crossed within subject with
all other factors. The parafoveal mask consisted of the
blob used in Experiment 1. 0n hall of the trials, this
lateral mask appeared spatially between the foveal prime
and the parafoveal stimulus (target or box). On the other
half of the trials, the mask did not appear. When the
mask did appear, its nearest outer edge was 1/2 degree
from the nearest outer edge of the parafoveal
stimulus. If the mask was on at the start of a given
trial, it remained on after the eye movement as well.
Like the factor Eye Movement Direction, Parafoveal
Mask was blocked. Therefore, all subjects participated m
four blocks, all possible combinations of Parafoveal Mask
(mask or no mask) and Eye Movement Direction
( lef t - to-right or r igh t - to- lef t ) . The order oi blocks was
counterbalanced across subjects according to a Latin
Square. The experiment was completed in four sessions,
one session for escn bloc*, ge„eraXl y run on consecutlve
aays, with eacn session l„ting 45 to 60 mi„ut„.
Design
The expenment consisted of 1440 trial. per
subject. The 1440 t.ale coasted of the lactoriai
combination of 30 (parafoveal targets) X 3 (related
versus unrelated versus neutral foveal prima) X 2
(parafoveal
.ask versus no parafoveal mask ) X 2
(parafoveal preview versus no parafoveal preview) X 2
(5 degrees versus 10 degrees visual eccentncUy ) X 2
deft versus right eye movement direction). Eye Movement
Direction and Parafoveal Mask were blocked and
counterbalanced across subjects according to a Latxn
Square.
Results and Discussion
The corrected mean naming latencies, collapsed over
items, subjects, direction of eye movement, and
parafoveal mask, are presented in Table 8. Naming errors
were again very infrequent (occuring on less than .01 of
the trials) and were randomly distributed across
conditions. As in Experiment 1, the analyses reported
here were conducted on the corrected mean response
times, with noise trials excluded. The mean percentage of
noise trials for each condition are also shown in
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mean
Table 8. The pattern oi results ± or th-^ I e corrected
naming latencies did not rdf-F^r- «differ from the pattern before
cor rect ion
Table 6
percentage of noise tr, wl „ by F^ ltv . p.„,„„.,,
Preview, and Foveal Prime.
No Preview Preview
Eccentricity re l unrel blob rei unrel blob
5 degrees 708 712 718 607 606 bU6
( . 05 ) ( . 07 ) ( . 06) ( . 04 ) ( . 05) ( . 04)
10 degrees 708 725 726 658 670 675
( . 07 ) ( . 09) ( . 08) ( . 08 ) ( . 08 ) ( . 09)
A 3 ( Foveal Prime ) X 2 ( Parafoveal Mask ) X 2
(Parafoveal Preview) X 2 (Eccentricity) X 2 (Eye Movement
Direction) within -sub j ect AN0VA was conducted on the mean
naming latencies, treating subjects as a random effect.
The first thing to note about the data from this
experiment is that the manipulation of Parafoveal Mask
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was totally without effect Pi an ln„ *.u1, l ci g the non-meaningful
blob between the toveal r,r-i m«x prime and parafoveal stimulus
produced neither a main efiect ( F < !
, nor lnteracted
wxth any other factor m any interpret able way.
(Parafoveal Mask did participate in two higher order
interactions. Fovea! Prin,e by Para±oveai Mask fay
Parafoveal Preview by Eye Movement Direction [F(2, 14) =
6.2821, p. < .OSJ and the five-way interaction involving
all factors CF(2,14>
= 4.8559, p_ < .03], but neither of
these interactions allowed any obvious interpretation.
Given the number of factors in the current design, and an
overall alpha level of .05, one or two spurious elfects
would be expected. Therefore, these interactions will be
ignored. ) Of particular importance is the fact that the
presence of the parafoveal mask did not increase the
amount of priming found at 5 degrees when there was a
parafoveal preview (3 msec priming without the mask,
-b
msec priming with the mask, neither of which differed
from 0 by t test;, as would be predicted if the lack of a
priming effect at 5 degrees with a preview were due to
the ease of seeing the preview. However, since there was
no overall effect of the parafoveal mask, it appears that
subjects were able simply to ignore it, and therefore
this condition does not allow a test of the hypothesis
that priming would be found at 5 degrees if the
parafoveal preview were made more difficult to see.
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As in Experi.ent 1, Direction of Eye Move.ent again
produced no main effect <F < l}| though lt did
participate in the two higher order interactions
described above. However, as those interactions had no
apparent meaning, this factor will not be discussed
further.
As would be expected, given the results of Pollatsek
et al. (1984) and Experiment 1 above, there was a main
effect of Parafoveal Preview CF<1,7) = 207.0796,
ft <
.0U005J. The mean naming latencies with and without a
parafoveal preview were 637 and 716 respectively. In
addition, there was again a significant Parafoveal
Preview by Eccentricity interaction, showing more of a
parafoveal benefit at a 5 degree eccentricity than at 10
degrees CF(1,7) = 71.1612, g_ < .0005]. At 5 degrees, mean
naming latency was 712 msec without a preview and 606
msec with a preview, giving a preview benefit of 106 msec
(compared with 103 msec benefit in Experiment 1). At 10
degrees, naming latencies were 720 msec without a preview
and 668 msec with a preview, for a preview benefit of 52
msec ( compared with 48 msec in Experiment 1 ) . The
significant main effect of Eccentricity [F( 1, 7 ) =
62. 0585, £ < . 0005J was clearly primarily due to the
trials on which there was a preview. These results
unambiguously show that subjects are able to use
parafoveal information quite far in the periphery.
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f primary interest in the current experiment is the
effect of the type of foveal prime seen on a
trial. Consistent with the view that context effects in
scene processing can be accounted for through the
operation of passive spreading activation ( inta- level
priming), the mam effect of Foveal Prime was significant
CF(2, 14) = 9.3399, £ < .005]. Mean naming latencies
were 670, 678, and 681 msec for the related, unrelated,
and neutral prime conditions, respectively. Planned
comparisons showed that the difference between the
related and unrelated conditions [ F ( 1, 7 ) = 8. 2363, p_ <
.05] and the difference between the related and neutral
conditions C F ( 1, 7 ) = 11. 3216, £ < .05] were both
significant, while the difference between the unrelated
and neutral conditions was not CF_(1,7) = 3.5648, g_ >
•05]. Using the neutral condition as a baseline, it
appears that there is an overall facilitat ion effect of
11 msec for a related prime, and no cost for an unrelated
prime. Therefore, within the Posner and Snyder (1975)
framework, these results indicate automatic f acilitat i ve
processing.
Finally, the pattern of results observed in
Experiment 1 ( when the non- meaningful blob prime was
removed from the analysis) between Foveal Prime,
Eccentricity, and Parafoveal Preview, was again found in
Experiment 2. Table 9 presents the the amount of priming
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found <the difference between the neutral condition and
the related and unrelated conditions) as a function
of Eccentricity and Parafoveal Preview. First, the
interaction of Foveal Prime with Eccentricity was
significant LF<2,14>
- 6.3801, p_< .03], showing more ol
a priming eifect at 10 degrees (
i
8 msec) than at 5
degrees (3 msec). Second, there was again a moderate
though non-significant tendency for there to be a larger
priming effect when there was no parafoveal preview (13
msec) compared with when there was a preview (7 msec)
[F<2, 14) = 2.5900, p_ = . 111. This result is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that more parafoveal information can
be extracted with a related object in the fovea. Third,
the three-way interaction between these factors was not
significant (F < 1), indicating that the eccentricity
benefit on priming was as large when there was no
preview as when there was a preview. As was indicated in
discussing Experiment 1, this last result is somewhat
counter-intuitive, since when there was no preview, the
only difference between the 5 degree and 10 degree
eccentricity conditions was the distance the eye had to
travel, and it is not clear why travelling further should
increase the amount of priming observed. Several
hypotheses will be considered as explanations for this
effect in Chapter 3.
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Table 9
Amount of priming (neutr.i m s nin rialafoH"u, u
'5 elated and unrelated
conditions
)
in mspr o
— 21S££ Parafovea l Preview ^
Eccentricity.
No Preview Preview
Eccentricity rel unrel rel unrel
5 degrees
10 degrees
6 4
ia i
-i o
17 5
In summary. Experiment 2 has replicated and extended
the results of Experiment 1. A consistent priming effect
was again found, such that the identification of an
object fixated after an eye movement was facilitated
given that a related object had been previously
fixated. In addition, no difference in target
identification time was found depending on the
predictability of the target given an unrelated object
(related versus neutral primes). Therefore, these data
are consistent with an automatic and passive spreading
activation account of the priming effect. An attempt was
made to determine whether the priming effect would be
increased if the parafoveal preview of the target
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were nade less salient. However, the
.an.pulatxon
introduced to test this was unsuccessful in that it
produced no effect at all. Therefore, whether a prxmxng
effect will occur at close eccentr icit xes if the target
object xs less easily seen in the paralovea remains an
open issue.
The general effect of allowing subjects a parafoveal
preview of the target object
replicated. Identification time was facilitated given a
parafoveal preview, and this effect was greater if the
preview was closer. The benefit of having the target in
the parafovea or nearby was also again found to be
contingent on the type of foveal prime presented: There
was less distance and preview benefit given a related
prime.
In the next chapter, several additional analyses
will be presented. These analyses attempt to rule out
some uninteresting explanations of these effects and
further try to narrow down the exact causes of the
patterns of data observed. In addition, a model will be
presented which accounts for the major trends in the data
and which suggests possible future directions.
CHAPTER III
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
In this chapter several additional analyses are
discussed which atte.pt to narrow down possible
interpretations of the data presented i„ Chapter II.
Priming, Preview, and Eccentricity
Recall that in Experiments 1 and 2, more prying was
found at 10 degrees than at 5 degrees, even when there
was no parafoveal stimulus. In this section, several
explanations for this anomalous finding are examined.
One reasonable explanation for the greater amount of
priming at 10 degrees than at 5 degrees even when there
was no preview is suggested by differences in saccade
latency and saccade duration. An examination of the
saccade latency data (where saccade latency is defined as
the amount of time it took to begin an eye movement
toward the parafoveal target once the trial display
appeared) showed that there was a significant effect of
eccentricity, such that it took an average of 240 msec
versus 260 msec to initiate a saccade to a 5 degree
versus 10 degree target in Experiment 1 [£(1,7)
113.5447, p_ < .0001 J, and 230 msec versus 244 msec in
Experiment 2 [F(l,7> = 43.7467, p_ < .001]. Differences in
saccade latencies of this type are not unusual
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Cg. PoilatSek .t al.. 19a4)> and are partlallythe
r6SUU
°
f i0"9er
~—« to adeqUatel y .ocate the
parafoveal stimulus, as well ac + hc ,n s t e longer time needed to
program the saccade at 1Q degrees
. In addltlQn> saccade
durations (the amount of time the eye spends travelling)
are typically longer at greater eccentricities. If the
assumption is made that activation can build to a higher
level at the target node given a longer stimulus onset
asynchrony ( SOA ) , then an explanation for the priming
difference at 10 degrees versus 5 degrees might be that
at 10 degrees the longer saccade latency and saccade
duration allows more activation to build up, and so
produces more priming.
If the longer SOA at a 10 degree eccentricity is
the cause for the greater amount of priming found at 10
degrees, then more priming should generally be found when
the saccade latency is increased. In order to test this
assertion, the data from both experiments were divided in
a mean split according to saccade latency. The mean
saccade latency for each subject in each block at each
eccentricity was computed, and the mean naming latency
was found for those trials on which saccade latency was
below the mean saccade latency and those trials on which
saccade latency was above the mean. These data were then
subjected to a 5-way ANOVA for the Experiment 1 data and
a 6- way ANOVA for the Experiment 2 data, with Saccade
so
was, in
Latency added to the original factors. There
fact, no tendency for there to be .ore priming at slower
saccade latencies, either overall (Foveal Prime X Saccade
Latency, Experiment 1, CF < 13
, Experiment 2, CF(2,14)
1.00533), or by eccentricity (Foveal Prime X Saccade
Latency X Eccentricit y, Experiment 1, C F < 12; Experxment
2, CF(2,14> = 3.0891,
. 05 < p_ < . 10] , In ±act
, th±.
marginal xnteractxon actually went in the wrong
direction, showing more priming at 5 degrees with a
shorter saccade latency. Thus, the data do not support
the idea that the longer saccade latencies at 10 degrees
are the cause of the greater priming found at 10 degrees
in the no preview condition.
A second possible explanation for this effect is
that at 5 degrees, the box-with-cross used as the
parafoveal target in the no preview condition was encoded
to a degree sufficient to cause disruption to the process
which integrates information across saccades. As has been
shown in the current experiments as well as by Pollatsek
et al. (1984; in progress), a great deal of parafoveal
information is picked up at 5 degrees. Assuming that
an inconsistency between information acquired in the
paraiovea (a box) and information acquired when that area
is fixated (an object) causes disruption of the
integration process (and possibly causes the visual
system to adopt an unusual processing mode), the finding
SI
of less priming in the no preview condition at 5 degrees
could be the result of an artxfact of the present
experimental setting. Unfortunately, there is no obvious
way to directly test this possibility given the data at
hand.
A thxrd possible explanation lor the equivalent
amount of priming found at 5 degrees and 10 degrees given
no parafoveal preview takes into account the fact that
the accuracy of a saccade depends, in part, on the
distance the eye has to travel. If subjects tend to land
more accurately on the target object given a shorter
saccade, then the greater amount of priming found at 10
degrees may be due to the fact that the quality of the
visual information picked up after a 10 degree saccade is
less than the quality picked up after a 5 degree
saccade. Previous work has shown that priming effects
increase when the target is visually degraded (Meyer et
al, 1975; Sperber et al, 1S79). Therefore, if subjects do
tend to land less accurately on the targets at 10
degrees, a likely explanation for the anomolous effect
would be possible.
In order to determine whether subjects were in fact
more accurate when moving their eyes 5 degrees rather
than 10 degrees, two indices of accuracy were
computed. The first index compared fixation position upon
first landing with fixation position when the target was
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named. Presumably the eye was closer to the preferred
viewing location when the target was named, and so the
difference between the fixation position when the target
was named (Fix 2) and the fixation position when the eye
first landed (Fix 1) should glve an indication of how
close to the preferred viewing location the first landing
was. The second index was the standard deviation of the
first fixation position. The more variable the fixation
position, the less accurate it would be on the
average. Both of these measures were computed in terms of
pixels, where 18 pixels equalled 1 visual degree.
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the above
indices provided evidence that the accuracy of the
saccades were inversely related to the eccentricity of
the target. In Experiment 1, the mean difference between
Fix 1 and Fix 2 was 12 pixels at 5 degrees and 31 pixels
at 10 degrees £ t ( 7 ) = 4.1319, p_ < .005], and the mean
standard deviation of Fix 1 was 19 pixels at 5 degrees
and 52 pixels at 10 degrees [ t_( 7 ) = 6.0314, p_ <
.0013. Similarly, in Experiment 2 the mean difference was
9 at 5 degrees and 19 at 10 degrees Ct(7) = 5.5961, p_ <
.0013, and the mean standard deviation was 16 at 5
degrees and 35 at 10 degrees Et(7) = 4.2817, p_ < .005J.
Thus, support is lent to the notion that a difference in
the accuracy of the saccade accounts for the differential
priming found at 5 degrees and 10 degrees when there was
93
no parafoveal preview. In addition th P * * „huo
'
ne finding presented
above that there may he mQre prlmlng glven ,
saccade latency is also consistent mh ^
interpretation if it is assumed ^ ^ ^
also less accurate.
A more direottest of the "bad landing gives more
priming" idea would be to examine only those trials on
which the. subject landed accurately at 10 degrees, and
then to determine whether there was less priming on these
trials. In order to attempt such a test, the mean Fix 2
(preferred viewing location) for each subject in each
block at each eccentricity was computed. Naming latencies
were then computed for only those trials on which Fix 1
(where the subject first landed) was within 1 degree to
either side of this position. Since the target objects
were 2 degrees horizontally, this would ensure that Fix 1
was on the object. As expected, many more trials met this
criterion at 5 degrees than at 10 degrees. However, since
there were so few trials which met the criterion at 10
degrees, the data were extremely variable and no direct
test was possible. Therefore, while the data support
the poorer accuracy of a 10 degree saccade, it must be
left to future research to determine whether this does in
fact increase the effect of context on object
identification.
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Items Analysis
In order for the intr.l.vel pr lming explanation of
oontext effects i„ scene Vleuing ^ be ^
alternative to schema theory i+ -i = *
'
xt ls important that the
priming effect shown in the i ac t „k *in l s chapter not be the
result of a few of the object pairs used a
stimuli. Therefore, items analyses were conducted. These
analyses showed exactly the same patterns of significance
as were found treating subjects as the random effect,
both in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Therefore, there
is no evidence that a few items were producing the
effects found.
Name Frequency Analysis
The naming paradigm employed in this thesis involves
at least two separate stages of processing, an object
identification stage and a name retrieval /production
stage. Therefore, it is possible that the demonstrated
priming effect had its locus at either of these two
stages. Since name retrieval is not a logically necessary
stage in normal object identification, the generality of
the priming effect to scenes would be reduced if it
were the case that the priming effect were occur ing
predominantly at the name retrieval /production stage. In
order to test whether the priming effect was occur ing at
the latter stage, additive factors logic ( Sternberg,
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1969) was employed. If the priming effect was occuring at
the name ret r leval / product ion stage, then priming should
interact with another factor known to afiect this
stage. Such a factor is the frequency in the language oi
the word or name produced. If, on the other hand, the
prying effect is occurxng at the object recognition
stage, then the effects of name frequency and prime
should combine additively.
In order to test this, the name frequencies of the
30 target objects were tound in Kucera and Francis
(19b7). The targets were then rank ordered and split into
3 groups of 10 according to name frequency. An ANOVA for
each experiment was then conducted on the mean naming
latencies, averaged over subjects, treating Name
Frequency as a between items lactor. The results of these
analyses were clear: While there was a main elfect of
Name Frequency in both Experiment 1 [£(2,27) = 5.1672, g,
< .05] and Experiment 2 CF(2, 27) = 5. 1048, £ < .05], such
that objects with higher ireqency names were named
faster, there was no hint in either experiment of a
Foveai Prime by Name Frequency interaction (both Fs < 1).
Therefore, these results are consistent with the
conclusion reached by previous researchers that the
object priming effect is not due to object naming. It.
appears, instead, that the priming effect is located at
the object recognition level of processing ( Huttenlocher
9b
* Kublc.*. lyB3; Kroil , potter
_ i9u4; ^ ^ ^
Visual Similarity Analysis
Aside from a passive spreading activation account Ol
the priming eilect demonstrated here, lt is possible that
the facilitation found for related primes was due to the
greater visual similarity of the related primes to the
target objects. Subjectively, the related primes did seem
to be more visually similar to the targets than the
unrelated primes. A visually similar prime could
facilitate the low level feature processing ol the target
through simple feature overlap (Sperber et al. 1979). a
priming effect due to simple leature overlap between
related objects would suggest an additional explanation
of the context effects found in scenes (since related
objects typically look more like each other, even in
scenes). However, such an effect would seem less robust
than a priming effect at the semantic level, since it
would be affected by such visual stimulus factors as
object orientation.
In order to determine whether visual similarity was
playing a role in the priming effect shown here, 4
subjects were asked to rate the related pairs on a 5
point scale ol visual similarity. The ratings were
extremely reliable lor the 10 least and 10 most visually
yy
•imil.r p.ir. f and th... w.r.
..i.ct.d th. mut;t
•Htrmm test at th. vi.ual
.imilarity ny poth<ftJ , u . Th#
m..n similarity rating lor the low similarity group v..
1.1 (rang. 1.0 to 1.25), and th. m.an lor the high
similarity group was 3.65 (range J. (J to 4.5). The overall
priming ellect lor these two groups at 10 xtems was then
examined. As can be seen in Table 1U, there i. no
Tabl. lu
The priming. ellect (in msec) In Exoenmgn^ i and 2, lor
*11 targets <n = JQ) and lor target which had, high (n^lu)
and low ( n 10) visually similar primes.
Priming
Experiment All Items High Sim Low Sim
1 1^ 12 15
^ 11 1U 17
indication of a reduced priming effect i or the 10
targets which were less visually similar to their
prime*. This result is consistent with Huttenlocher and
Kubicek (1983), who explicitly controlled the visual
similarity of their related and unrelated primes to their
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target, and
.till found
. sl2eabie priming effect
_
There is, therefore, no evxdenoe that the prx ming
effect found here oan be expired at the level of vlsuai
similarity.
Naming Latency Frequency Distribution Analyses
The effect of having a parafoveal preview of the
target was shown to be quite large and robust. The cause
of thia effect is thought to be an integration of the
information picked up in the parafovea with the
information picked up once the eye fixates the target
(Pollatsek et al.
, 1984). In other words, since some
information has been picked up in the parafovea, less
processing needs to be done in order to identity the
object once it has been fixated.
An alternative account of the preview effect
suggests that subjects are sometimes identifying and
beginning to name the parafoveal target before they move
their eyes. According to this explanation, the preview
effect is due to a full identification of the object in
the parafovea on some proportion of the trials rather
than to the integration of partial information across
saccades. While Pollatsek et al. provided some evidence
against the full parafoveal identification explanation,
it would seem beneficial to show this for the current
experiments. To this end, frequency distributions of the
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naming latencies were prepared T f +kfx s . I the parafoveal preview
b.„.*it i. due to subjects td.„tllylnfl and bpginning to
hame the target beiore they move their eyes on a
signxfxcant proportion ox the prevxev trl.l., then the
hamxng latency dxstrxbutxone should tend to be bxmodal
when there xe a prevxew. The two peaks of the bimodal
dxstrxbutxon would reflect the trxals on .hxch subjects
did and did not identify the parafoveal stimulus. On the
other hand, xf the parafoveal benetxt is primarily due to
the xntegratxon of xnformatxon pxcked up before and after
the eye movement, the naming latency dxstrxbutxons for
the preview and no preview trials should be similar, with
the mean of the former merely shifted to the left
( faster responses )
.
In order to test these opposing predictions,
frequency distributions of the naming latencies were
created in the following manner: The mean naming latency
for each subject in each experiment in each condition was
found. Thus, these means collapsed over only the
particular target presented. Next, the number ol trials
which fell into a distribution cell 25 msec wide was
computed. These cells were centered at the mean naming
latencies, i.e. the first cell greater than the mean
would be from Mean to Mean + 25 msec, the next would be
from Mean + 25 to Mean * 50 msec, etc. , and the first
cell less than the mean would be Mean - 25 msec,
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etc. Next, these distributions uere coiiapsed #y#
'°re 'ent «d the bteks „hxch die, not Inciud.
the blob condition ln Eltp.rlm.nt 2 were CQilapsed
•tth the Experi,e„t 1 distributions. The collapsing was
always centered at the means <5o the*s that extraneous variables
such as eye movement direction and practice effects
across blocks would not affect the distributions.
The resultant distributions are shown depicted in
Figures 2 through 5. (Only the related and unrelated
foveal prime conditions are shown, since the blob prime
trials of Experiment 1 could not be combined with the
neutral prime trials of Experiment 2. ) In essence, these
figures are smoothed histograms, with the width of each
histogram cell shrunk to a point. Each point along
the X-axis therefore represents one distribution
cell. For example, the point labeled "1" represents the
cell from the Mean to the Mean 25 msec, and the cell
labeled represents the cell from the Mean to the
Mean - 25 msec.
As can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the shapes
of the distributions for the preview and no preview
conditions are extremely similar. Figure 2 presents the
preview and no preview distributions, centered around
their means, for the related prime condition at a 5
degree eccentricity. Figure 3 presents the same
distributions for the unrelated prime condition. While
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the preview distributions are fiatter and . b±t wider
than the the no preview distributions, they are
strikingly similar, and there la r«i-ner is no evidence of
bimodality given a preview.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 present ^i.tr ibutions
analogous to Figures 2 and 3, except with a 10 degree
eccentricity. These distributions are more variable than
their 5 degree counterparts, but the same conclusion
emerges. There does not appear to be any evidence in
these distributions favoring the hypothesis that the
preview effect is due to the identification of the target
in the paratovea. Instead, it appears that the parafoveal
preview gives those targets a "head start", so that they
are identified faster once they are fixated.
It should be pointed out that the slight flatening
and bulging of the preview distributions (especially the
bulges at about -200 msec from the mean) may indicate
that on a small proportion of the trials subjects are in
fact recognizing the target in the parafovea. The above
discussion is not meant to suggest that this is not the
case, especially when the preview is at 5 degrees.
However, the important point is that the similarity
of the distributions is substantial. Therefore, this
analysis makes it appear extremely unlikely that such
trials are the predominant cause of the preview effect.
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
Frequency Distributions lor in degree undated trial*,
preview and no preview, cent ered at their means.
distribution cell
no preview + preview
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
In this chapter a model is presented which accounts
tor the experimental data. General conclusions are then
discussed.
A Model
In this section a model will be proposed to account
tor the major trends in the data. It should be notea that
this model is consistent with but not forced by these
data. The model is meant to be a heuristic device and is
speculative.
The model assumes a "pictogen" framework (Seymour,
1973; Warren & Morton, 1982) which is based upon but not
identical to Morton ' s ( 1969) logogen model ot word
recognition. In this framework, each object will be
thought of as having a categorizing element or pictogen
which receives input from sensory and contextual sources,
where contextual sources are defined in terms of objects
only. Each pictogen has a resting level ot
activation. The level of activation can be increased
above the resting level by input from the sensory and
contextual inputs until it reaches a threshold, at which
time the pictogen "fires" and the object is recognized.
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The Pictogen for an object will be thought of as
having connections to the pictogens of other objects
which are semantically related to it. For example, the
pictogen representing a cat would have connections to the
pictogens representing a dog, a lion, etc. Further, if
the activation level of a pictogen reaches a high enough
level, then this activation will spread to the other
related pictogens, raising their activation levels
also. Thus, encountering a cat will tend to raise the
activation level of the pictogens of all related
objects. However, there will be no effect on the
pictogens for unrelated objects (see Posner & Snyder,
1975)
.
The outline above provides enough machinery for
explaining the priming effect. It suggests that when a
related prime is seen in the fovea, the level of
activation for the corresponding pictogen increases, and
this activation then spreads to the pictogens of related
objects. When a related object is fixated next, it can be
identified faster since its level of activation is
already closer to the identification threshold. Less
activation from the perceptual source is required in
order to reach the threshold, so less time is spent
processing the object perceptually.
In order to account for the parafoveal preview
effect and its interaction with priming, an additional
108
assumption is necessary. This assumption is that the rate
at which activation based on perceptual information
accrues at the pictogen depends upon the quality of the
visual stimulus. If the quality is good, then the
activation level will increase quickly; if the quality
is poor, then activation will increase more slowly. Such
stimulus factors as eccentricity and preview will thus
affect the rate: If the object is foveally fixated, then
activation will rise rapidly. If the object is seen in
the parafovea, but it is close by, then activation will
rise more slowly. If the parafoveal preview is further
away, then activation will rise more slowly
still. Finally, if there is no preview, then there will
be no perceptual input to the pictogen and the activation
level will not change.
A general assumption of the model will be that the
combined amount of activation which context and
parafoveal inputs can produce is a parameter that changes
with setting, task demands, etc. Under some conditions,
subjects may allow these sources of activation to
continue to produce activation until the identification
threshold is reached. For example, if the task were
parafoveal identification, then this might be the
case. In applying the model to the experiments reported
here, this assumption will be strengthened to state that
the perceptual system puts a limit on the amount of
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combined activation that xt will =iinu fun allow the prime plus the
parafoveal stimulus to produce. This strong assumption
will be true whenever the object is going to be fixated;
xt prevents the prime and parafoveal glimpse from having
too much weight and prevents misident if icat ion. As has
already been discussed, the data suggest that subjects
were not identifying the parafoveal stimulus until it was
fixated.
The experimental paradigm used in this thesis can be
broken down into two separate segments of time. During
the first, the preview period, the subject sees the
foveal prime and the parafoveal stimulus. The foveal
prime is encoded, and activation spreads to related
pictogens, raising their activation levels. At the same
time, if there is a parafoveal preview, activation from
the perceptual source also begins to accrue at the
pictogen of the target object, with the rate of accrual
dependent on the eccentricity of the parafoveal
preview. Activation continues to increase until either
the eye moves or the limit is reached . Now the eye moves
to the target object and the object is
fixated. Perceptual activation increases in rate because
the visual information is better, but there is still a
difference in activation rate depending on the distance
of the saccade. At 10 degrees, the eye lands less
accurately, and activation accrues slightly less rapidly
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than after a 5 degree saccade
. In either ^
xdentxfxcatxon takes place as soon as the actuation
level reaches the ident ificat ion threshold.
This simple model accounts for all of the trends in
the data. A numerxcal example will help make this
clear. It should be kept in mind that the numbers
for the example are totally arbitrary. However, the
pattern of numbers shows how the model works.
Assume that the resting level for any pxctogen xs 0
units, the recognxtxon threshold xs 100 units, and that a
related prime adds 5 units of activation. Further, assume
that if there is no parafoveal preview, 0 units are
added. If there is a 10 degree preview, 2 units are
added, and if there is a 5 degree preview, 10 units are
added. Finally, assume that the limit that a prime
plus a parafoveal preview can add is 10 units of
activation.
When the display first appears on the screen, the
prime is encoded, and if it is related, activation
spreads to the target, raising its activation level by 5
units. At the same time, the parafoveal preview raises
activation of the target as well. If the limit is
reached, activation stops increasing. Table 11 displays
the activation level for the target depending on the
type of prime and the distance of the preview.
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Table 11
The activation level nf a nirtn^ den.n^ n q on tvnP nf
prime and parafoveal preview.
related unrelated
Eccentricity no prev prev no prev prev
5 degrees
10 degrees
5
5
10
7
0
0
10
Now the eye moves to fixate the target. If the eye
moves 5 degrees, then assume that activation will
increase at a rate of 15 units per unit time. If the eye
moves 10 degrees, assume that the rate of activation
increase is 10 units per unit time. The number of units
of time that will be needed to reach the threshold will
be C(100 - prior activation) / rate]. The number of units
of time to reach identification threshold by condition is
given m Table 12.
Table 12 represents the amount of time needed to
identify the target in the various conditions. The
numbers in this table are in arbitrary time units, and
model only the identification time ; later stages such as
response selection and motor programming are thus not
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modeled. The main effort
s
iiec s of prime, preview, and
eccentricity are evident, as well +k<=db n as the eccentricity by
preview interaction.
Table 12
Length of time to reach threshold h v condition
related unrelated
Eccentricity no prev prev no prev prev
5 degrees 6.33 6.00 6.66 6.00
10 degrees 9.50 9.30 10.00 9.80
By subtracting the related times from the unrelated
times at each level of eccentricity and preview, Table 13
is produced. As can be seen there, the eccentricity by
prime, preview by prime, and even the anomolous greater
priming at 10 degrees versus 5 degrees without a preview
effect is evident. Finally, as was found in both
experiments, no priming is produced at 5 degrees when
there is a preview. A comparison of Table 13 with Table 9
from Experiment 2 shows remarkable similarity.
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Table 13
The priming effect as predicted by the modPl
Preview
Eccentricity none target
5 degrees
. 33 0- Q0
10 degrees
.50
. 50
The model thus does a good j ob of accounting for the
data produced by the experiments reported in Chapter
2. It uses as a primary mechanism automatic spreading
act 1 vat ion among nodes or pictogens in an organized
semantic representation of objects. There seems to be no
principled reason why the model cannot be extended to
account for the effects of context found in scene
perception also. Tests of the adequacy of the model in
accounting for scene processing must await future
research.
Conclusion
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This thesis examined the effects of context on
object identification. Numerous prevxous studies
(dxscussed xn Chapter 1) have shown that objects are .ore
easxiy xdentxfxed when they appear in an approprxate
scene context than when they appear xn an inappropriate
context. Almost wxthout exclusion, researchers working xn
this area have discussed these results in terms of a
schema model. While these schema models have not been
clearly spelled out, they all assume that a scene level
representation is computed very rapidly (on the order ol
100 msec), and that this representation then feeds
information top-down to the object level, facilitating
the recognition of objects which are predicted by the
scene.
An alternative explanation for the effects of
context on object identification was proposed in Chapter
1. This explanation, called the "intralevel priming"
hypothesis, posits that some, if not all of the effects
of context in scene processing, can be explained by
passive spreading activation between nodes at the object
level of representation. Consxstent wxth thxs hypothesis,
Experiment 1 demonstrated that objects were identified
faster after a saccade if a related object rather than
an unrelated object had been fixated
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previously. Experiment 2 replicated this result and
further showed that the benefit on identification tim.
was due to facilitation from the related object rather
than to inhibition from the unrelated object. Thus
these data supported the hypothesis that passive
spreading activation was producing the difference in
identif icat ion time.
Aside from manipulating the relation of the object
fixated prior to the fixation on the target object, these
experiments also manipulated perceptual factors important
in normal scene viewing. These factors included the
distance of the target object prior to the saccade and
whether or not the target object could be seen in the
parafovea. Based on the results of these manipulations,
in combination with the prime manipulation, a model of
the interaction of contextual and perceptual factors on
ob j ect identification was proposed.
The model proposed can be considered a more
specified version of the intralevel priming
hypothesis. I t assumes a network of pictogens, with the
pic togens linked according to semant ic
relatedness. Activation is assumed to travel along the
links, allowing identified objects to prime the pictogens
of related ob j ects. Each pictogen is also assumed to
acquire activation from perceptual sources, with the rate
at which this activation accrues determined by the
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quality of the perceptual input. Finally itf , is assumed
that there is a limit tn + k«o the amount of activation which
can accrue before + k«6 thS tar9et object is actually
fixated. Using this simple modelH a i, a qualitative fit to
the main trends in the data k *oi both experiments was
possible.
The question which now remains is whether the
intralevel priming model can account for context effects
when an actual scene is empioyed as ^
opposition to the schema model, the intralevel priming
model would predict that the last one or two objects
fixated, rather than the scene as a whole, should be
the predominant cause of the context effects found in
scenes. Since coherent scenes tend to contain many
related objects, the effect of overall scene context
found in previous studies may have been produced by
intralevel priming. What is needed is a direct comparison
of the schema and intralevel priming models.
One way to test the intralevel priming model further
would be to examine the effects of related objects on
object identification in non-scene displays of more than
two objects. Since the schema model posits that a
coherent scene, with all objects in their correct spatial
positions, is necessary in order to access an appropriate
schema, it has no way of accounting for context effects
produced in such displays. In fact, Biederman (personal
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COmmUniCatl °n) believes that if displays like this are
presented tachistoscopically, a "pop out" effect will
occur such that an object unrelated to the other objects
in the display will be identified
.ore easily than an
object related to the others. In contrast, the intralevel
priming model would predict that an object related to the
others will still be identified more rapidly due to
spreading activation among the related objects.
Several studies are currently underway which attempt
to examine these opposing predictions. In one set oi
studies being conducted by Peter DeGraei, groups of
related and unrelated objects are displayed
tachistoscopically, and the accuracy of identifying a
target object in the parafovea is examined. In these
studies, DeGraef is also manipulating the relatedness of
a centrally fixated object to the target object in order
to determine the relative benefit derived from foveal and
parafoveal related primes. In a second set of
experiments, I am using non-scene displays of related and
unrelated objects to examine their effects on eye
movement variables such as saccade length, fixation
probability, and fixation duration. It non-scene displays
produce context effects similar to those found with
normal scenes, then it will be clear that a schema model
need not be invoked in order to explain these effects.
Perhaps the most direct contrast of the schema and
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intralevel prlming models „Quid ^ ^^ ^
related to each other tB . scene CQntext ^^
they did not belong. For exampley. r , an octopus and a shark
could be placed in an outdoor far-™QOO rm scene, where they
would be ancoious. Previous research has shown that if
the octopus alone were placed in such a scene, it would
be fixated lonqer than i -f -1 +x.na ± xt were in an underwater
scene. However, « a shark had been fixated prior to
fixation on the octopus, would this result
.till be
found? If so, the result would suggest that the schema
model is indeed correct. However, if not, then thxs would
suggest that the intralevel priming model is
correct. Something in between would suggest that perhaps
both play a role in scene processing.
Throughout this thesis I have presented the schema
model and the intralevel priming model as mutually
exclusive and opposing explanations of the effects of
context on object identification. The presentation of
these models as dichotomous stresses the differences
between them and motivates research into the effects
of context that otherwise would not be
considered. Certainly the models do use entirely
different types of processes in order to account for the
context effects. However, the experiments presented in
this thesis were meant to show that the intralevel
priming model provided at least a motivated alternative
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to the schema model, not to provide evidence that the
schema model is wrong. Such evidence of the inadequacy of
the schema model, if it is to be forthcoming at all, will
have to await future research.
A final point is the possibility that both the
schema model and the intralevel priming model are
correct. It may be, in fact, that both the overall scene
and the relations between the individual objects in the
scene influence object identification. This possibility
could easily be integrated into the model presented in
Chapter 3 by allowing input to the pictogen from the
scene level. However, it should be stressed that there is
currently no reason to propose such a change to the
model.
In sum, it could perhaps be said that the main
contribution of this thesis will be to lorce the
advocates of the schema position to prove that schemas
are necessary in the face of an alternative account.
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